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German Banks in the Global
Economy: Global Pressures
and Public Sector Banking
Jason A. Gorn
German banking is distinguished from neighboring European banking systems by the influence of its public sector banks. Nearly
50% of German banking is carried out by government owned state banks (ländesbanken) and regional savings banks (sparkassen)
whose roots date from the 18 th century. German banks play a particularly important role in the economy and exert more
control over firms and corporations than do their American counterparts. German banks tend to be less profitable than foreign
counterparts. German public banks were originally founded to foster local and regional business. However, the operations of
German public sector banks now extend into all forms of international investment. German public banks are currently seeking
new business models to increase profits as they are being forced to compete in the global financial market under liberal market
practices dictated by the European Union. Turbulence in the global financial market precipitated by the U.S. sub‐prime mortgage
meltdown has severely impacted German public sector banks, precipitating a banking crisis that leaves German taxpayers
exposed to staggering losses. These global financial pressures dictate the restructuring of the German financial system. This
restructuring has forced a breaking point in the traditional German corporatist banking model and is associated with significant
risks to the stability of the German banking system.

PITZER COLLEGE

Preface
The increasing pressure of globalization on domestic economies has given rise to
theories of economic convergence based on liberal market financial practices. Since the
United States and its allies first approached global financial markets under the practices
of Breton Woods, the die was cast toward a convergence of economic policies. Beginning
with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, which later
evolved into the European Union, Europe has also pressed for increased free trade. Two
main foundations, or models, of economic policy formed within the Western capitalist
system. The first economic foundation, or model, is the liberal free market model defined
by open markets and unguided prices. These markets are exemplified by the American
and British models and are characterized by an emphasis on capital markets. The second
economic model is the “coordinated” or “communitarian” model that is characterized by
higher levels of bank participation in firms and more domestically oriented financial
policies. Germany follows this model of a coordinated market economy, particularly as it
relates to its banking system. Today, Germany finds itself at a crossroads in economic
policy. As global pressures knock at the door of the German market, what are the needs
and possibilities for German economic readjustment?
The German economic system is sometimes referred to as brittle or ailing.
However, the German system has adapted in the past to the changes and pressures
presented by the international economy. The German economy recently absorbed some
serious blows stemming from the U.S. sub-prime mortgage meltdown that cracked the
foundations of its three pillar banking structure. The resulting financial crisis caused the
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insolvency of several publically controlled state “landebanks” (ländesbanken) and a
cooperative bank. These threats to German banks have resulted in increased calls to
reform the German banking system. However, the question as to how much Germany
stands to gain or lose by reforming its financial and banking system is complex.
I have employed a multi-level institutionalist approach in attempting to
understand the many structural and institutional problems currently facing the German
financial system. This approach includes some assessment of the German domestic
socio-economic environment in which the German banks operate, as well as the evolving
European socio-economic environment, and the international (or global) economic
environment. The global financial environment is increasingly affecting all components
of the German financial system, despite the regional or at least national focus that much
of the German banking system has historically maintained.
The German financial system is based on a multi-tiered banking structure,
referred to as a three pillared banking system or structure. In order to assess Germany’s
place within the international financial system and to allow for an understanding based on
a comparison to other national financial systems, it is necessary to describe the
components of the German three pillared banking system. An understanding of the likely
evolution and future direction of German banking is enhanced by an historical
understanding of how this system evolved, along with some relevant examples of this
process and an explanation of the banking structure itself. Recent stresses on the German
banking system created by the presently evolving international financial crisis
precipitated by the U.S. sub-prime mortgage investment bubble will be examined for
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insight into how the German banking system is faring under this latest strain, which was
brought on by the convergence of financial markets in a global economy.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Since the dawn of the 20th century, with the exception of the years
immediately after Word Wars I and II, the German economy has maintained a
central position in the international market as the most vibrant economy in Europe.
Germany is the third largest economy in the world. Thirty‐five and a half percent of
Germany’s GDP came from exports in 2002.1 Germany was second in world trade to
the U.S. in 2000, accounting for 9.5 % of world exports.2 Statistics such as these that
indicate the economic might of the present German export machine appear
incongruent with the analyses of some academics and business pundits who
ruminate over the perceived long‐term competitive weaknesses of Germany in the
global economy. The concern for Germany’s competitiveness relates to the presence
of subsidies in some sectors of the German economy with a degree of protectionism
inherent in Germany’s coordinated market economy. Subsidies and pseudo‐
protectionist practices persist in Germany’s coordinated market economy despite
an apparent economic openness that relates to the free trade needed for exports.
Protectionism and subsidies are significant factors in the German banking
industry that distort competition in banking. German savings banks (sparkassen)
and their allied head institutions, the state banks (ländesbanken), are semi‐public
institutions that “can compete with commercial banks under privileged conditions,
thereby driving down the rates of return. If these…institutions fail, the

1
2

Siebert H, p 5
Siebert H, p 2
7

municipalities and the länder [states] will pick up the bill.”3 As semi‐public
institutions, these banks are also protected against corporate takeovers since they
are not for sale. This protectionism limits consolidation in the German banking
industry and distorts competition. “This means that, in an international comparison,
German banks are not efficient.”4 Furthermore, this market distortion in the banking
sector pervades into virtually all sectors of the German economy due to the capacity
of banks to uniquely influence industry and to coordinate the activities of industries
within the German economy to a much greater degree than in most other countries.
The influence of banks on firms in Germany occurs because of German corporatist
financial policy. The German corporatist structure relies much more on banks for
financing rather than the securities markets that dominate the U.S. and British
systems. These policies also give the banks considerable influence in the governance
of German firms and banks often have a voice in the strategic plans of these firms as
well. Ironically, this German financial strategy was not so much the result of reform
in response to domestic pressures in Germany, but resulted from changes in
response to the international economy and was for years perceived as providing a
competitive advantage with some protectionist features.
German corporatist practices are centered on the German mentality of
shareholders as company stakeholders rather than outsider investors. The shares of
German companies, particularly the voting shares, are not widely distributed
compared to the broad distribution of company stocks held by mutual funds,
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Siebert H, p 223
Siebert H, p 223
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pension funds, insurance companies, private institutions, and individuals in the
United States or in the United Kingdom.5 German shareholder voting blocks and
company board seats are much more tightly held and include very strong
representation by the banks allied with the company, in addition to the possible
holdings of the company’s founding families, other German companies, and in some
cases the state. These German shareholders typically have a long‐term stake in the
company whose shares they hold. These German investor‐stakeholders are
generally seen as risk adverse investors that are interested in the long‐term stability
of the corporation. These investors are, to a considerable degree, also concerned
with the social implications of risky organizational change.6
The classic role of the banks under German “corporatist” structure can be
seen in the example of Daimler‐Benz (prior to its acquisition, and subsequent
divestment, of the U.S. Chrysler Corporation). Daimler‐Benz, like most German
corporations, had a “lesser reliance on capital markets and outside investors and a
stronger reliance on large inside investors and financial institutions to achieve
efficiency…”7 Instead of stock market investors, German firms like Daimler receive
strong support and investment from banks. German banks are very influential in the
running of German companies. The German banking system has an “extraordinarily
intimate relationship with the big industrial groups….[that] allows the banks to act

Brecht M and Mayer C, p 29
Luo Y, p 38
7 Luo Y, p 42
5
6

9

as brokers, investment analysts, dealers and much else besides.”8 Representatives of
the banks sit on the boards and commissions of the German companies in which
they invest. The corporate influence of the banks is further enhanced by the fact that
the banks are able to vote by proxy on behalf of shares deposited with them by
clients. Ernst‐Jürgen Horn analyzed a sampling of German corporations and found
that the banks themselves owned on average more than 25% of shares in the
sampled companies. The banks also controlled through proxy votes more than 25%
of the shareholder votes in 41 of the sampled corporations and over 50% of the
votes in 30 of the corporations sampled.9 For example, in the late 1980s and the
1990s banks were the top 5 shareholders in Daimler‐Benz and controlled 78.39% of
the company’s voting stock.10 Deutsche Bank in particular had deep and historic ties
to Daimler‐Benz. Deutsche Bank’s investment consisted of approximately 28% of
Daimler’s stock in 1993 and this bank wielded incredible power in managing
Daimler‐Benz.11
This dominant role of banks is a central part of traditional German
corporatist policy. The role of banks means that external capital markets exert
relatively little influence on German corporations. Purported advantages to this
corporatist system include less pressure for corporations to pursue short term
outlooks aimed at maximizing share price, thereby allowing a greater emphasis on a
corporation’s long‐term strategic interests. These advantages occur because

Horn E‐J, p 55
Horn E‐J, p 56
10Logue DE and Seward JK, p 90
11Logue DE and Seward JK, p 90
8
9
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German banks see themselves as long‐term stakeholders in the company rather
than speculators in the company’s stock. The fact that the shares of German
companies are concentrated in fewer hands than the shares of typical U.S. or U.K.
companies also discourages corporate takeovers.12
Germany’s strong corporatist policies have more recently come under
pressure in an increasingly global economy. While the pressures of an international
economy have been prevalent since the end of the Second World War, the 21st
century presents a new mix of problems and an enlarging cast of competitors.
Globalization pressures beyond product competition have permeated into German
economic structures. Even existing protectionist practices in the German financial
market did not prevent the current financial crisis caused by U.S. sub‐prime
mortgage securities from wreaking havoc on some German banks, resulting in the
financial failure of two German ländesbanks and a cooperative bank, as well as
forcing other German banks to write down billions of dollars in losses. Four German
ländesbanken are estimated to have a combined exposure to risky assets of 80
billion euros (117.2 billion dollars), placing German taxpayers in the states that own
these banks at considerable financial risk.13 The effects of the American sub‐prime
mortgage crisis and other economic pressures, such as the international
competition for financial services, provide case studies that are useful in assessing
whether or not Germany can compete and thrive by continuing to employ
domestically centered corporatist practices that decrease the efficiency of the
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Gorn JA, p 41‐42
“Landesbanks’ subprime exposure 80 bln eur‐report”, Reuters UK, 1/26/2008
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German financial sector. The sub‐prime mortgage crisis certainly shows that
German corporatist banking practices are impacted by the tide of global financial
forces.
Some might argue that instead of indicating a need for change, perhaps these
global financial pressures indicate a continued need for Germany’s coordinated
market economy, which has the advantage of fostering collective business action in
order to assure social and economic stability, even if this advantage occurs at the
cost of ongoing subsidy and protectionism in the financial system. Answering this
question requires an analysis of the structure and history of the German banking
system and the different functions that each of its three main types (or “pillars”) of
banks were meant to serve. This background on the German banking system will
facilitate an examination of some of the pressures that the globalized economy is
exerting on the German financial system.
The German financial system has not been as static as one might think.
Historically, Germany has made changes through incremental adjustments to its
financial system and economic policies as the result of economic pressures. The line
between American free market practices and German corporatist policy was more
defined forty years ago. The convergence of international markets has already
pushed the two systems closer together. German financial institutions and
corporations have had an increased presence in the Anglo‐American securities
sector in recent years. Some in Germany point to this as a source of trouble, and this
argument has increased in credibility as the result of the present crisis caused by
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securitized sub‐prime U.S. mortgages. There has also been a relative weakening in
the role of banks in dictating policy to German industry. These changes are the
observable results of market convergence.
The existing convergence of German financial practices toward the Anglo‐
American model occurred because of the need to conform to global practices in
order to compete in a global market. This has, to a degree, changed how German
institutions operate. The once “cozy” and orderly state and national banking
structures that acted as universal banks in Germany now find that, “Ever more
efficient capital markets and specialized non‐bank financial institutions have
allegedly eroded the once strong role of traditional universal banks. Apparently,
German banks are suffering from the same fate as their peers around the world.”14
The landscape of the international financial market has changed; Germany stands to
lose if it fails to change with the times. The old German market that could seemingly
allow the world to change around it with little impact on the economic policies of
Germany is gone. While global competition is one thing, Andreas Hackethal
describes the other side of the coin, namely the susceptibility of Germany and other
world economies to an international economic recession and financial crises. Such
international crises will “show whether the majority of German banks will
eventually be able to cope with the growing challenges by concentrating on core
competencies, improving efficiency and possibly by inter‐group cooperation and

14Hackethal

A, p 71
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consolidation, or whether the German banking industry is indeed in a state of
terminal decline.”15
The old phrase, “When the United States sneezes, the whole world catches
cold” threatens to prove true again with the American sub‐prime mortgage crisis
and resulting U.S. recession wrecking havoc on the world’s financial system,
including the German banks. According to Mark Lander in the New York Times, “This
is not the first housing downturn to cross boarders, but its reverberations have been
amplified by the integration of financial markets. When faulty American mortgages
end up on the books of European banks, the problems of the United States aggravate
the world’s problems.”16 At present, despite some changes, Germany still maintains
many of its corporatist business and financial practices and its distinct three pillar
banking system. This banking structure remains at the center of the German
economy and differs from the banking systems found in common free market
models. 17 The following chapters describe the landscape of Germany’s banking
system, as well as the clouds that hang over these German institutions.

Hackethal A, p 101
Lander M, New York Times, 4/14/2008
17 Deeg R, p xi
15
16
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Chapter Two: The Structure of the German Banking System

The Three Pillar System

The German banking system is allocated into three pillars. Each pillar is
comprised of many individual credit institutions. The three pillars consist of: 1)
public sector banks, 2) cooperative banks, and 3) the commercial banks. The banks
that make up each of these three pillars differ in their goals and ownership.

The First Pillar: Public Sector Banks

The first pillar is largely based on public sector savings banks (sparkassen
and their regional big brothers, the ländesbanken). This pillar has its origins in the
18th century. The German Johann Joachim Becher, along with the Englishman Daniel
Defoe and the Frenchman Hugues Delestre, called on the government to supply a
banking system that would allow everyone, including the poorer classes, to deposit
their money in a bank in hopes of acquiring interest. The poorer classes were the
targets of this effort since the existing private banks where not interested in dealing
with the poor, working class. These people were forced to save their cash under
floorboards and in mattresses, which kept their money out of the investment market

where their saving could be put to work for the benefit of the economy. The first
savings banks of the time “…were simple, usually private institutions that collected
savings deposits and invested them, primarily in state bonds and, to a lesser extent,
in loans to local governments and individuals. After the post‐Napoleonic political
reconstruction of the German states, local governments began to use their recently
expanded authority to bring existing private savings banks under their
administration, or to create new ones.”18 This practice began as early as 1778 with
the founding of the first public savings bank in Hamburg.19 Rapid and widespread
growth followed as several German states promoted similar banks, supposedly “to
prevent the growth of an urban, industrial proletariat through support for
production in agriculture and small craft firms.”20
Through government support, the number of these savings banks grew, and
merchants and craftsmen of all sorts benefited as they began to receive more local
lending from these banks. “By 1836, 280 savings banks had already been founded,
the vast majority of which belonged to the municipalities either directly, or
indirectly through the local government groups.”21 State regulation influenced the
savings banks to invest in sectors such as low‐risk mortgage loans or state securities
and this left little for small‐business investment. This regulation caused a “vacuum”
in small‐business lending that eventually brought about the rise of the cooperative
banks, the second pillar of the German banking system, to facilitate loans to

Deeg R, p 34
Sinn H‐W, p 17
20 Deeg R, p 34
21 Sinn, H‐W, p 17
18
19
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tradesmen and small businessmen. The restrictive lending policies of the savings
banks, which required collateral in exchange for credit, initially blunted their role in
facilitating German industrialization.22 Savings banks did not take on the role of
hausbanken, in which the banks build a long‐term financial relationship with firms
by acting as the premier lender and stakeholder for a business (or firm), until
Germany was unified under Bismarck in 1871. Berlin based savings banks
pioneered the role of German banks as hausbanken for industry. The resulting
economic and entrepreneurial boom brought a new transformation in joint stock
bank foundings.23 As savings banks took on the role of hausbanken, banking and
industry became tied together, with banks providing “continuous financial relations
with large firms, providing short‐ and long‐term capital to industry, primarily
through current account credits….From the 1880s onward, the Berlin banks
continued to expand their dominant position in industrial finance.”24 Thus, German
capitalism was driven by its banks as much as it was driven by its industry.
German savings banks became increasingly influential in the following
decades. By the turn of the 20th century, the German savings bank sector had slowly
transformed itself into a universal banking system; but, this advance required the
savings banks to overcome challenges that threatened their long‐term survival
during the last two decades of the 19th century. First, the savings banks were limited
in creating additional lending methods through the lending of capital by float

Deeg R, p 34
Deeg R, p 35
24 Deeg R, p 35
22
23
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mechanisms, which limited their expansion at the time. Float mechanisms are
cashless transfer payments that allow easier transfer of funds. Because banks in
Germany could not do this at the time, they could not expand into larger markets.
The second challenge for the German savings banks in the last two decades of the
19th century was that German industry was outgrowing the capacity of the savings
banks to finance and invest in German firms. The cooperative banks faced this
challenge as well. The expanding capital needs of German middle and large‐scale
industry put pressures on the banks to become bigger. To further counter these
pressures, the German savings banks consolidated by forming regional associations
in order to provide some liquidity equalization among themselves. In 1884, several
regional associations joined together to form the Deutscher Sparkassenverband.
Through this association, the banks lobbied the government on the needs of the
savings banks, furthering the ties between the savings banks and the states.25
Through the remainder of the 19th century and into the 20th century, the German
savings banks remedied the competitive demands placed on them by organizing.
From 1907 until the Depression and the banking crisis of 1931, the savings
bank associations expanded their role into typical commercial banking activities.
After a severe shortage of capital plagued the German economy in 1907, the savings
banks were able to secure Imperial legislation in 1908 that finally allowed them to
offer checking accounts and cashless transfers, activities that previously were only

25

Deeg R, p 35‐36
18

allowed to the commercial banks.26 The liberalization of restrictions on the savings
banks by the state was in part due to the extremely difficult banking circumstances
of the time. Worse times lay ahead for the banks. Hyperinflation in the 1920’s,
followed by the banking crisis of 1931, increased the stresses on the bank sector.
During this time there was a dramatic consolidation of the traditional commercial
banks, the third pillar of the German banking system. These large commercial banks
expanded their operations into the provinces, threatening the locally oriented
business of the savings and cooperative banks. The savings banks responded by
increasing the strength of their associations and by lobbying the länder (states) to
allow them to further expand into areas of commercial banking. The commercial
and cooperative banks joined together to try to block the savings banks from
expanding their banking activities through a political campaign. With the help of
their state (länder) benefactors, the public savings banks again prevailed in their
effort to liberalize governmental restrictions on their commercial banking activities.
The länder granted the savings banks further entry into the commercial banking
market by allowing the savings banks to make larger industrial investments in
German middle‐sized firms (the mittlestand). 27
The savings banks were granted independent legal and organizational status
in 1931 to separate them politically from their local governments and give them
more control over their own business practices. This policy protected the savings
banks from abuse by their local governments, as defaults on extensive loans made

26
27

Deeg R, p 37, 39
Deeg R, p 40‐42
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by savings banks to their local governments had played a big role in the insolvency
of savings banks in the bank crisis of 1931.28 At the same time, however, local public
ownership and liability for deposits was maintained. An “obligation guarantee”
(Gewährträgerhaftung) was enacted whereby the public entity that founded a
savings bank (a municipality or state) was made liable in the event of a default by
their savings bank. This guarantee protected third party lenders to the savings
banks and, in effect, served as a sort of subsidy that allowed these banks to obtain
third party capital at lower rates than other banks because the capital was
guaranteed by a government entity. Subsequently, a “maintenance obligation”
(Anstaltslast) was also placed on the public entity that founded the savings bank as
well. This required the state entity to infuse capital into the savings bank if the bank
was threatened with insolvency.29 In practice, over the years, local governments
have not often had to make good on this maintenance obligation. Given the
constraints of government budgets and a desire to minimize the stigma that an
insolvent bank would have on its region, banks threatened with failure are typically
pushed into mergers with healthy institutions to avoid government bailouts.30 By
the 1930s, the German savings banks had matured into their “traditional role” as
universal banks.31
Following World War II, bank competition between the three German
banking groups (pillars) continued with the commercial banks competing for the

Deeg R, p 43
Hackethal A, p 78
30 Hacketal A, p 78
31 Deeg R, p 37
28
29
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business of consumers and mittelstand firms, becoming more like the regional and
local savings banks, while the savings banks continued to compete in broad areas of
commercial banking. Today this intergroup competition continues, with the
ländesbanken (regional state banks) increasingly providing commercial and
investment banking services to larger domestic and foreign clients. The public
ländesbanken and local savings banks (sparkassen) continue to serve as hausbanks
for their respective states and municipalities. They do not compete for consumer
services outside of their regions. Nevertheless, they remain universal banks and
increasingly provide all banking services, with extensive international investments
as well. Ländesbank investments also include securities, as is evidenced by the U.S.
sub‐prime mortgage securities held by ländesbanken that resulted in multi‐billion
euro losses in the present international financial crisis. German banking system
adjustments have been incremental; the platform and design of this system has been
intact since the savings banks were reconstructed after the Second World War.
Today, the German public sector banking pillar is divided into two tiers. The
first tier of the public sector banks is divided into 13 State banks (ländesbanken) and
534 Savings banks (sparkassen). The second tier is comprised of the development
banks (ländesbausparkassen). These two tiers comprise one pillar because they both
operate on a regional level. The two tiers combined comprise nearly half of the
banking market in Germany.32 The sparkassen are organized by their respective
state (land) and are “essentially the base of the ländesbanks. It [the sparkassen]

32

Brunner A et al, p 2
21

collects the savings which the ländesbanks can then use to finance international
risk.”33. However, the state governments (länder) are the major stakeholders in
their regional ländesbanks and the “mandate of the sparkassen and ländesbanken is
to foster the economic development of their regions by following viable business
plans. As part of this mandate, the sparkassen and ländesbanken are expected to
subsidize local public goods….While the sparkassen and ländesbanken need not
maximize profits, retained earnings are intended as their main source for funding
new business.”34 Although the ländesbanken are public entities of the state
governments, the ländesbanken operate much like private banks in the sense that
they operate in the same financial sectors as private banks. Legally, ländesbanken
are stock companies that are owned by the regional savings banks (sparkassen) and
the state in which they are located. For example, the ländesbank West LB, which has
been ranked as the 5th largest German bank, is 42% owned by the State of North
Rhine‐Westhphalia, 17% by the Rhenish savings bank (sparkasse) and 17% by the
Westphalian savings bank (sparkasse), with additional ownership held by regional
authorities.35
Until recently, the liabilities from a landesbank’s investments were backed
and guaranteed by the state in which they are located according to the specific
statutes mentioned above (the Gewährträgerhaftung and Anstaltslast statutes). This

Sinn H‐W, P 17
Brunner A et al, p 3
35 Siebert H, p 221
33
34
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insured that they were “endowed with an unlimited public warranty for survival.”36
Because they are given state support, these ländesbanken investments are given
AAA ratings. While most of the services are geared toward financing, ländesbanken
provide several services to the state, acting as hausbanks for their state and local
government authorities. This involves providing loans to the state. Ländesbanken
are also clearing banks that process the cashless payment transactions between the
savings banks (sparkassen).37 The advantages that ländesbanken enjoyed as public
banks with unlimited state guarantees helped them to extend their investments
beyond their respective states and helped them to expand into global investments.
The European Commission challenged the German public sector bank
guarantees enjoyed by the sparkassen and ländesbanken after the European
Banking Federation filed a formal complaint in 1999 claiming that these guarantees
constituted anti‐competitive state aid.38 In 2001, the European Commission and the
German authorities agreed that the public sector guarantees for the sparkassen and
ländesbanken would be abolished after a transition period that allowed guarantees
for investment obligations made up until July 18, 2005 and maturing before the end
of 2015. No public guarantees apply for obligations entered into after July 18, 2005.
This does not mean that the German public sector banks no longer enjoy any
benefits from public support, however. The public remains the ultimate owner of
the ländesbanken and sparkassen and public support would be forthcoming in the

Sinn H‐W, p 1
Sinn H‐W, p 10‐11
38 Grossman E, JCMS, v 44(2), p 338
36
37
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event of a bank crisis. This implicit public backing has proved to be true in the
current crisis precipitated by the U.S. sub‐prime mortgage securities meltdown, as
demonstrated by a publically underwritten bailout of the SachsenLB ländesbank by
the state of Saxony together with aid from the region’s other public banks (i.e.
sparkassen).39 The sparkassen have to stand behind the ländesbanken due to a joint
institutional protection scheme. Also, the agreement to eliminate direct guarantees
on the investments of public banks still allows public guarantees if they are
remunerated at market rates. 40 The remaining state‐backed protections afforded to
the German public banks will continue to provide a security safety net to boost the
debt ratings on their investments. Higher debt ratings resulting from these de facto
guarantees will likely continue to provide public banks with access to the cheaper
capital that provides them with a continued competitive advantage over private
banks. This advantage is only partially eliminated by the phasing out of the direct
public guarantees.
The second tier of the first pillar consists of the “development banks” or
ländesbausparkassen, which are specialized public banks on the federal level, as
opposed to the municipal or state level. These banks complement the regional
ländesbanken and sparkassen. The original purpose of these development banks
was to fund the reconstruction of the German economy following the Second World
War. The most important of these development banks is the Kreditanstalt für
Wiederaufbau (KfW), whose early tasks included the distribution of funds provided

39
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Dougherty C, New York Times, 2/28/08
Brunner A et al, p 24
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by the Marshall Plan.41 Subsequently, this sector dealt with sustainable growth
policy and helped finance German reunification. These are not typical banks, as
“they do not accept deposits from retail clients.”42 The largest institutions were the
KfW and the Deutsche Ausgleichsbank (DA) that merged in 2003.43 The new KfW,
like the predecessor KfW development bank, is owned by the German Federal
Government, which uses it to help implement government policy. For example, the
KfW is charged with organizing Germany’s international development aid program
and has worked on securitization with other banks. These development banks are
highly specialized and rarely step out of their assigned roles. In 2003, for example,
“Germany's five biggest banks … confirmed plans to pool their loans in an attempt to
tidy up their battered balance sheets….In an unusual deal, Deutsche Bank,
HypoVereinsbank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank and DZ Bank are forming a joint
venture with state‐owned Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau [KfW]…..the venture will
hold a fund….this fund will then be chopped into pieces and sold on to investors as
bonds, a process known as securitisation.”44 These banks directly link the Federal
Government to the banking system. In total there are “11 Länder building societies
(Ländesbausparkassen), 21 public insurance companies, and various leasing and
factoring companies.”45
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The Second Pillar: The Cooperative Bank Sector

The second pillar of the German banking system is the cooperative sector
(Volksbanken or Raiffeisenbanken and Spar und Dahrlehenskassen). This second
pillar is also comprised of two tiers. Although the cooperative banks usually operate
on a regional basis, they are not compelled to do so and they are often the main
competitors of the sparkassen in certain small towns or rural areas.46 They do not
receive guarantees from the government; nor are the cooperative banks split
amongst the German states. The cooperative banks were founded in the 19th century
as “self help organizations for craftsmen, workers, and farmers….most cooperative
banks concentrate (voluntarily) on their respective local markets and do not
compete with one another, but some…are now offering services to everyone across
the country.”47 These banks were developed because, “In the early nineteenth
century German craftsmen and farmers suffered from dire financial constraints
because the existing private bankers were largely focusing on trade finance, private
commercial banks were mainly granting loans to the manufacturing and
transportation industry, and savings banks had to request collateral in exchange for
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credit.”48 The founder of the cooperative banking system was Herman Schulze‐
Delitzsch, who wanted to promote a banking system that could assist the craft
sector of the economy without adopting socialist practices or resorting to state
protection, while at the same time protecting the craft sector from extinction at the
hands of large scale capitalism.49 Schulze‐Delitsch created the first credit
cooperative in 1852. The idea spread quickly around Germany and by 1859 there
were 80 commercial credit cooperatives consisting of 18,000 members in total.50
The first banks that formed were local banks whose capital was generated by
members who pooled their money together and borrowed from the bank when
necessary. The banks were at first often operated on a part‐time, honorary basis.51
The cooperative banking system evolved over the next few decades. Like the
ländesbanken, the cooperative banks also suffered from the credit crisis that
occurred around the turn of the 20th century and had difficulty supplying their
members with the credit that they needed. Two factors transformed and
institutionalized the cooperative banking system. The first factor was the passing of
the Imperial Cooperative Law in 1889, which expanded the roles of the cooperative
banks by allowing them to offer short‐term current account and acceptance credits
to their members, like the commercial banks offered to large firms. This allowed the
cooperative banks to operate on the level of formally organized universal banks
rather than simple lending institutions. The second boost that these banks received
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came from the Prussian state government. In 1895, the Prussian government sought
to protect its farming and craft industry by forming an independent bank
organization to act as a central bank for the cooperative banks. This bank structure
was known as the Preussenkasse. It was capitalized by the Prussian government and
operated under public law.52 However, many of the cooperative banks refused to
work with the Preussenkasse believing that this amounted to accepting state aid
and compromised the principle of self‐reliance on which these cooperatives were
founded.53 The German cooperative banks grew throughout the beginning of the
20th century until the hyperinflation of the early 1920s and the bank collapses of
1931. The hyperinflation period turned out to have a silver lining for the
cooperative banks that survived. When the hyperinflation wiped out the equity of
the cooperatives, the state acted through the Preussenkasse to stabilize the still
surviving cooperatives with an infusion of state supplied capital. The cooperatives
were given a financial position in the Preussenkasse. Giving the cooperatives an
interest in the Preussenkasse allowed cooperatives that had previously been
opposed to accepting state aid to compromise by accepting aid through the
Preussenkasse.54 The acceptance of the Preussenkasse as a central bank for the
cooperatives strengthened the status of the cooperatives as banking institutions.
With the help of the Preussenkasse, the cooperative banks faired reasonably well
durring the 1931 banking crisis. Subsequently, the Preussenkasse was reorganized
with the national government taking over the major portion of governmental
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ownership in the Preussenkasse from the Prussian state government and renaming
it the Deutschlandkasse.55 In the years that followed the banking crisis, the
cooperatives were able to regain their equity capital due in large part to their role as
intermediaries in war finance.56
Following World War II, Germany began to promote market mechanisms in
the banking sector as part of the post‐war German social economy policy. The
resulting expansion of market mechanisms in the banking sector changed some of
the traditional banking practices. More recently, EU involvement has also expedited
this process. Two big factors changed the entire banking system. “First, in 1957 the
new central bank—the Bundesbank—was established. Second, the deutschmark
was made freely convertible and capital controls were eliminated, thereby opening
the door for the gradual integration of domestic and international capital
markets.”57 These reforms transformed the system and the role that the cooperative
banks played. The noticeable shift in German banking toward a more Keynesian
policy shifted further in 1967 with the adoption of the Stability and Growth
Promotion Law (Statbilitätsgesetz)58. The Social Democrats that came into power
around this time followed this law with other measures to ensure competitiveness
in German industry and the banking sector.
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These changes benefited the cooperative banks the most. “With their vast
network of banks and branches, the cooperatives were well positioned to capture
the fast growing consumer banking business.”59 Internally, a shift was taking place;
the nature of the cooperative banks was transforming in the midst of all the
competitive reforms. Georg Draheim, the President of the Deutsche
Grenossenschaftskasse, or DG Kass, (the successor of the Deutschlandkasse) argued
that the cooperative banks served dual purposes. The first purpose was as “business
enterprises,” but the second purpose was as “member communities”60 whereby the
goal was to provide mutual aid to its members. This system meant that the
cooperatives conformed to market‐oriented management, but that profit
maximization was not essential since this might run contrary to their second goal as
cooperatives working to aid their members. Thus, the cooperative banks fit well
with the political philosophy of the social economy that prevailed in Germany in the
late 1960s. As the result, “the cooperative banks were the success story of the post‐
1967 era. In less than two decades, they doubled their market share of total bank
business, while their membership grew almost exponentially.”61 Following the
1960’s reforms, the 1970’s brought further change. Until the 1970’s, only members
who qualified could receive loans from cooperatives. In 1972, however, the German
credit cooperatives organized into the German Association of Volks‐ and
Raiffeisenbanks. This reorganization of the cooperatives represented a partial
emulation of the German Association of Savings Banks. After this reorganization, the
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cooperative banks allowed non‐members to receive loans from their institutions.
During the 1970s, the role of cooperatives as viable market‐oriented businesses, as
well as mutual aid societies, was reflected in the mergers of hundreds of
cooperatives as competition with the other banking pillars forced the cooperatives
to improve cost‐efficiency through greater size.62 In 2003 there were approximately
1,500 cooperative banks servicing 15 million members63 While the roles of the
cooperative bank pillar have greatly expanded, along with its growing market share
that includes 13% of total domestic banking assets64, the 15 million member‐
owners of the cooperatives who are also the depositors of these banks can no longer
closely monitor the performance of this pillar. The elected representatives of bank
members select a supervisory board; however, this board may have little discipline
over management.65 This is because of many factors, one being that because shares
in ownership of a cooperative bank are limited, an outsider group cannot amass
enough shares to mount a takeover attempt of a poorly run cooperative bank. Thus,
cooperatives are frequently plagued by slow growth. Smaller local banks are
particularly susceptible to this problem because of the lack of diversification in their
investment portfolios. This problem is somewhat balanced by the presence of a
cooperative bank association that can perform some supervisory functions and
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exert pressure on the management of a poorly performing bank to accept a takeover
or merger.66

The Third Pillar: The Commercial Banks

The third and final pillar consists of the commercial banks. These banks were
first established in the middle of the 19th Century. Their establishment was in
response to the limited ability of private bankers at the time to satisfying the
investment needs of the rapidly expanding industrial sector. Before the
establishment of the German commerce banks, “Industrial finance came largely
through personal and familial relations.” 67 Investment was further complicated
because of the political fragmentation of Germany in the first half of the 19th century
that also fragmented German capital markets. To meet the capital demands of
industry, the big private bankers began to form consortia in the form of joint‐stock
credit banks. The great banks of Berlin, in particular, fostered the development of
industry by forming relationships with industrial firms, typical of the German bank‐
firm relationships that have continued to be the hallmark of German capitalism. The
big three German commercial banks, the Dresdner Bank (1872), Deutsche Bank
(1870) and Commerzbank (1870) all emerged in the 1870’s. By 1931, there were
66
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eight major German joint stock commercial banks, based in Berlin. Only the “big
three” commercial banks emerged from the German banking crisis of 1931. The
bank crisis of 1931 started with a run on the 4th largest commercial bank at the time,
the Danatbank, which failed. During the 1931 bank crisis, the state bailed out and
merged numerous other banks. Following the crisis, only three major commercial
banks remained, the Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank, and only
the Deutsche bank escaped rescue through majority state ownership.68
The second interruption in the commercial banking sector was the
disbanding of the commercial banks into 30 independent regional banks by the
Allies after Second World War in order to prevent a concentration of German
economic power. As the Allies became preoccupied with Russia during the cold war,
and an economically strong Germany became an important bulwark in the Cold War,
the banks were gradually allowed to reconsolidate. The reconsolidation of the three
German commercial banks was completed by 1957.69 Today’s commercial banks
function in a similar fashion to the way they did after their founding, “they still act as
Hausbanks to Germany’s large industrial corporations and form the core of
Germany’s private commercial banking group.”70 This sector continues to be
dominated by its largest banks, now known as the “big four,” after the addition of
the HypoVereinsbank to the “big three.” The “big four” consists of Deutsche Bank,
HypoVereinsbank, Dresdner Bank, and Commerzbank. These four large commercial
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banks control around two thirds of the sector’s business.71 “Although all four banks
belong among the largest commercial banking institutions in the world, their
combined market share in German non‐bank deposits was less than 14 percent at
the end of 2000. They operate 2,973 branches compared to the 16,892 branches of
the savings bank group and the 15,332 branches of the cooperative banking
group.”72 Deutsche Bank, for example, is an internationally known global investor;
however, Deutsche Bank has a total market share in Germany of only 5.4 percent.73
The Commercial banks are at a competitive disadvantage with the ländesbanken
due to their lack of public sector guarantees. This difference potentially leads to a
higher cost for commercial banks when they have to raise capital in the capital
markets or attract depositors since investors in the commercial banks do not enjoy
the state guarantees on their commercial bank investments and deposits that the
ländesbanken receive. While at a potential competitive disadvantage with their
ländesbank rivals, commercial banks manage risk by operating a voluntary deposit
protection system administered by the commercial bankers association. This “safety
net” helps the commercial banks to compete with the German public banks and
cooperatives for deposits.74 German commercial banks are highly dependant on
retail customers. To compete for customers, the four large commercial banks in
Germany provide incentives to customers, such as allowing common ATM
withdrawals, whereby a member of one commercial bank can withdrawn funds
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from the ATMs of the other commercial banks. Although this example may show
collective action to counter the ländesbanken and cooperative banks, it should be
added that, “Commercial banks are defined as a group primarily by their common
legal foundation, not because of interbank cooperation as is found in the savings or
cooperative banking groups. Commercial banks compete individually against other
commercial banks and the two other banking groups.” 75 While competitive, the
German commercial banking pillar pales in its relative importance to the German
market, as compared to the domestic market roles of the major Anglo and American
commercial banking giants. While commercial banks play a significant role in
German banking, the larger ländesbanken dominate the contemporary German
banking market.
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Chapter Three: German Banks and their Role in the German
Economy
Many analysts emphasize the power that banks wield to influence corporate
policy and governance in the German corporatist economy. German universal banks
are often seen by these analysts as benevolent stakeholders in German firms that
provide long‐term debt financing while maintaining direct shareholdings, board
representation, and proxy voting rights. This makes the banks of paramount
importance in corporate governance. At the same time, other analysts describe this
type of universal banking relationship as malignant to the efficiency of the market.
These analysts point to the potential for banks to abuse their influence on firms in
order to sustain their entrenched positions in corporate governance. This
relationship can potentially allow banks to exploit firms for their own advantage, for
example, by blocking transfers of firm control that would otherwise increase a firm’s
efficiency, corporate profits, or market advantage.
Ralf Elsas and Jan Pieter Krahnen point out that these extreme positions
about the dominance of German bank power, for good or for evil, are somewhat
overstated myths.76 While banks may wield significant influence on large publically
traded German corporations, the vast majority of German firms, as assessed by
either the number of firms or by sales, have no public equity. Banks play no role in
these firms as shareholders, board members, or proxy voters. The only role of banks
in these smaller firms is as lenders. Since banks are by far the largest source of
76

Elsas R. and Krahnen JP, p 197
36

capital for these firms, one can still argue that banks play a major role in the success
of these firms. The long‐term role of banks as hausbanken for large and small
German corporations must be considered separately for each sized firm to be
understood. It is the role of banks as hausbanken that is typically evoked as a
relatively unique and meritorious function of the German bank‐firm relationship.
For some, however, these merits are controversial, particularly in a globalized
economy that is supposed to favor a form of Darwinian efficiency.
This section will first address the role of banks in smaller German firms and,
second, the role of banks in large German corporations. While German banks
traditionally exercise considerable influence over firms, a larger policy question
concerns the degree to which the German states and federal government can exert
control over the banks to steer economic and corporate policy and influence the
market. This consideration becomes an obvious issue in a country with a large state
owned banking sector. German banks can and are used to exert state direction at
various levels. First, the development banks, or ländesbausparkassen, are tools used
by the federal government to enact and bolster policy. Second, savings banks
(sparkassen) and the ländesbanken can be used to bolster regional and state
interests. The roles of banks as mediators of economic policy reflect the great
importance of the bank in the German economy.
The possibility that the failure of German banks could lead to failures of
businesses and the economy as a whole is a reasonable concern, particularly
because of the exposure of German states (and taxpayers) in the event of a public
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sector bank crisis. Post‐World War II Germany has avoided large‐scale bank failures.
In recent years, Germany has had to deal with only an occasional insolvent bank,
typically coping with these problem banks through mergers and consolidations. The
present global financial crisis gives some reason to consider the risks of a possible
bank crisis in a German banking environment in which publically held banks are
making international investments, particularly in poorly regulated securities,
leaving the domestic taxpayer at risk.
Before embarking on an analysis of bank‐firm relationships, some traditional
institutional practices in German banking practice must first be addressed.
Typically, the investment strategies employed by banks to fund the activities of
firms is not encouraged solely by profitability. As a result, the profitability of the
German banking system as a whole is relatively low compared to other countries.
For example, the Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD)
states that German bank’s pre‐tax return on assets (ROA) was only around ¼
percent in 2000‐2001.77 Profitability is substituted for other factors, such as long
term strategic planning and competencies based on close networking and
relationships between the banks and firms. There are also networks between the
managers and technical personnel of a firm and their counterparts in the firms of
major suppliers and corporate clients, as well as networks through industry
associations. German companies have seats on the supervisory boards of other
companies and are often involved in joint development of technologies or
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products.78 Banks typically have multiple, even incestuous “insider” views of an
industry and a company through their relationships with multiple companies.
As a result of these extensive bank‐corporate networks, banks in the German
corporatist economy “typically provide companies with access to finance that is not
entirely dependent on publicly available financial data or current returns. Access to
this kind of ‘patient capital’ makes it possible for firms to retain a skilled workforce
through economic downturns and to invest in projects generating returns only in
the long run.”79 Furthermore, “The prevalence of long‐term investment has the
consequence that firms from [such] stakeholder systems often pursue growth in
market share at the cost of lower rates of return on equity investment.”80 While
firms in typical shareholder economies have a greater capacity to exercise more
flexibility in markets and to undertake “big leaps”, firms in the typical German
stakeholder model typically make “small steps.” This is due to the coordinated
relationships between the actors, primarily the investors (the banks) and the firms
themselves. “Changing a strategy involves bargaining, is information intensive, and
requires patience on [the] part of the stake holders.”81 While this may result in
precisely targeted end results, the deliberative nature of this process between the
banks and firms beleaguers the process, often times making companies and banks
slow to compensate for loses or changes in the market. While small fluctuations in
the market do not sink the ship, large dips make the vessel cumbersome in a storm.
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The Role of Banks in Small to Mid‐Size German Firms
An analysis limited to only the large corporate sector would result in a failed
understanding of the German banking and enterprise sector relationship. The goal
of this section will be to highlight the great importance of small and medium‐sized
firms, the mittelstand, to the German economy and the role of the banks in these
firms. These firms can be defined based on their annual revenue or by the number of
employees. Typically, small firms earn annual revenues of 50 million euro or less
and consist of fewer than 500 employees. These firms may seem insignificant when
compared to multinational corporations such as Siemens or Allianz; however, of the
2.9 million enterprises in Germany, 2.6 million (89.4 percent) have annual revenues
of less than 1 million euro. 82 These smaller firms have a cumulatively large impact
on the German economy. An analysis of these firms provides one of the best
indicators of the Germany economy.
These mittelstand firms are frequently called the backbone of the German
economy.83 These firms remain semi‐autonomous in decision‐making. “Instead of
having hired managers, as in the incorporated large enterprises, entrepreneurial
effort of the owner‐entrepreneur plays a decisive role.“84 Such companies may be
most affected by fluctuating markets, taxation, regulation, and credit squeezes. This
has to do with the fact that a predominant number of these small firms are built
around niche markets, most being in machine construction and specialty technology

Siebert H, p 8‐9
Siebert H, p 10
84 Seibert H, p 10
82
83

40

that was often developed or advanced by the owner‐entrepreneur. These firms
provide Germany with the ability to produce a diversity of high quality products,
often producing more customized goods for their clients in comparatively smaller
batches than the mass‐produced products of large corporations. Development of
such high quality specialized products often requires considerable research and
development, making the success of such companies potentially very dependent on
obtaining long‐term capital.
The markets for the products of these companies products can be drastically
affected by changes in the economy. The ability of these smaller firms to weather
economic down turns requires being able to obtain credit based on the future
potential of the company in times of economic distress. These smaller and middle‐
sized German firms are primarily or entirely dependent on banks for their financing
since these private firms lack public equity. The survival of these collectively
important firms is highly dependent on the German construct of the hausbank. The
hausbank serves as the primary lender to a firm and maintains a close relationship
to the firm. This relationship includes the sharing of timely information with the
bank that allows the bank to develop and maintain a close, long‐term relationship
with a firm. The bank‐firm interaction is based on a trusting relationship, as
compared to lending that typically takes place at an arm’s length in other Western
countries. Because the hausbank has access to confidential business information
about a firm over time and through repeated interactions, the bank can better assess
its risk when making a loan under this privileged relationship. This may potentially
lower the cost of a loan if the bank feels confident that its loan will be a good long‐
41

term investment based on the prospects of the company. The close ties of a bank to
a firm may also make a bank more likely to subsidize a company in times of distress
based on perceived long‐tern success potential and the prospect of obtaining further
investment returns (interest) on loans to the firm in the future. This hausbank
relationship therefore depends on the existence of a two‐way street in which the
firm typically remains mutually committed to its hausbank. The commitment of the
firm to its hausbank naturally occurs because the firm is so dependent on the bank
for its survival given the time that it takes to develop this relationship. Both the
bank and the firm feel a “special responsibility” toward each other in this
relationship.
This relationship may enable banks to subsidize a firm’s development at
times. Loans made for the relative long term based on relationship lending fosters
long term planning by firms and helps firms get through financially stressful times
by keeping the cost of borrowing down due to a higher level of trust on the part of
the bank. Because of mutual long‐term interest in maintaining the relationship
between the bank and the firm, this relationship based lending may at times also
work in favor of the bank and drive up the cost of lending to the firm in good times,
when the bank my set a higher rate of interest on its loans to a firm. However, the
long‐term relationship between the bank and the firm also provides for contractual
flexibility through renegotiation of the lending terms if the situation of the company
changes.85 However, the reliance of small and middle sized firms on one or at most a
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few bank lenders for all their capital needs presents a potential challenge to the
German system in times of a credit crunch, such as the now widespread sub‐prime
mortgage crisis.

The Role of Banks in Large Firms and Multi‐National German Corporations

Large German firms include the large multinationals such as Volkswagen,
Daimler, Bayer, Allianz, and Seimens, which generate a large portion of their value
abroad. Although large German corporations are publically traded, unlike their little
brothers in the mittlestand, banks still dominate corporate governance of large
firms in the German system. German universal banks hold direct equity states in
publically traded German companies and are usually represented on the
supervisory boards of large firms. The voting power of the banks extends well
beyond the shares that they directly hold because the banks also hold proxy voting
rights on shares that bank customers buy through the banks. The influence of banks
on large corporations has therefore more to do with direct corporate control than
with the provision of credit alone.
As noted, German commercial banks traditionally own substantial shares in
large German companies. The 1990’s saw an actual increase in the level of bank
share holdings. In the beginning of the 1990’s, German banks owned 10.3 percent of
shares in German companies, by the end of the 1990’s the percentage of bank
owned shares in German companies rose to 13.5. By comparison, only 3.4% of
43

shares in American companies were bank owned at the end of the 1990s.86 German
banks hold stock in many companies, even in companies within the same industry
(“cross holdings” of shares). The position of banks on the supervisory boards of
multiple large publically traded corporations often allows banks to have contact
networks with, and to exercise active influence on, the corporate customers and
suppliers of a given company, and vice versa. “This system of corporate governance
is an insider control system.”87 The by‐product of this is that banks can mitigate and
control their own credit risk. However, in practice, the bank members of these
corporate supervisory boards often “end up with many broad mandates and usually
a major day job as well, often resulting in a lax ‘duty of care’ and conflicts of interest
in the ‘duty of loyalty,’ [which is] the essence of board responsibility.”88 In fact, even
when a bank’s holdings do not include proportionally strong share holdings in a
company that would otherwise warrant a board seat, “Bankers tend to be elected to
the supervisory board because of their comprehensive information on other firms,
corporate trends, the political scene, and international developments.”89
It is important to note that German banking practices regarding cross‐
holdings are changing, particularly since 2002. These practices historically enabled
German businesses to keep foreign competitors and potential take‐over bidders at
bay. As financial markets have grown closer together, the German financial market
has also become less isolated and protected. “The shareholder structure is becoming
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more international; several major German companies are now listed at the New
York Stock exchange…and have to satisfy the transparency demands that listing
entails.”90 Tax reforms enacted in 2002 relieved the seller of cross‐holding shares of
tax liability on the sale of these holdings. This removed an incentive for banks,
corporations and insurance companies to continue to hold on to these shares and
the banks and companies responded by selling off some of their cross‐holdings,
typically reinvesting the proceeds back into their core business.91 This process
continued apace. In 2005, Eric Pohl, Chairman of Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein,
was quoted in The Banker as saying, “Germany Inc. no longer exists. While
many…have failed to notice, German corporate restructuring is pretty much
complete. The cross‐holdings [that German Companies and banks traditionally hold
in each other] have been disentangled.”92 Although this statement likely represents
a degree of hyperbole, the German banking and corporate system is clearly evolving
and not static.
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The Role of Banks in Transmitting and Influencing German Government
Economic Policy in the German Coordinated Market Economy

As the above analysis of the role of the banks in both smaller and larger
German firms reveals, the financial system in the German coordinated market
economy has the ability to provide access to long‐term, or “patient”, capital. This
patient capital can, for example, help maintain the employment of skilled workers in
the event of an economic downturn or provide capital for projects that will generate
returns only in the longer term. This kind of financial investment requires banks to
have “insider” knowledge of a firm’s business that may not be reflected by the firm’s
current balance sheet and is typically not public knowledge. This information on a
firm’s business, acquired through the business and political networks described
above, is necessary in order for banks to monitor the performances of companies
and ensure the value of their investments.93 The availability of long‐term investment
that helps stabilize the economy and maintain employment is in the public interest
and, therefore, in the policy interests of the state in the context of the German
coordinated market economy. The availability of patient capital requires a high
degree of stability in the banking sector. Such investment strategies require a
lowering of risk because they can result in lower profit margins than those achieved
by banks in comparator countries with more competitive banking systems.94
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Maintaining such stability has been a major goal of German banking policy through
public bank ownership and government regulation of the financial system.
Bank regulation has an important impact on the function of a financial
system and on the economy as a whole. Historically, bank regulation in Germany has
focused on bank stability to protect depositors while maintaining the flow of capital
to the firms that employ the workers and contribute to the Gross Domestic Product.
This policy has succeeded in achieving a very high degree of bank stability in the
post‐war period, at least until recently. This stability was fostered by regulations
that often restricted competition with foreign banks and non‐bank suppliers of
financial services. Bank regulators have used this anti‐competitive regulation to
promote banking in Germany as an economic “… ‘safe haven’ [that is] not vulnerable
to excessive risk taking.”95 These regulations include laws that foster the close
networks of ties among the banks, firms and trade associations that allow for
“imperfect competition” in the German coordinated market economy. Such insider
networks would likely be considered illegal anti‐competitive practices in a liberal
market economy such as the U.S. Although more recent European Union regulations
have forced a retrenchment in the “anti‐competitive” regulations affecting German
banks, the effects of coordinated market practices linger.
Public ownership of German banks must, of course, be considered in
assessing the role of the banks in government economic policy. The close tie of
public banks to their municipalities and states provides an obvious conduit for these
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banks to lobby the government. Conversely, by cooperating with government
objectives, the banks might hope to escape government regulations that threaten
their position, creating a mutual interest in cooperation between the banks and
government. For their part, “politicians like to exercise control of banks because the
banking business provides…[the] opportunity to…fund projects that serve the
politicians’ own purposes.”96 These conflicting interests touch on a significant
regulatory need in a system in which the government owns banks; the need to
regulate the interactions between public banks and their municipal and state
governments.
As noted in the first chapter, municipalities that defaulted on loans made to
them by their savings banks worsened the bank crisis of 1931. Even today,
according to Fischer and Pfeil, “state governments use the Landesbanks as their own
development banks and directly pursue what is officially stated to be the interest of
the state in terms of regional economic development. The same can be said about
public savings banks and the influence exerted by politicians at the municipal
level.”97 A degree of cross ownership in public banks does help mitigate the
influence of a single municipality or state, however. For example, the municipal
savings banks (sparkassen) are each usually owned by groups of municipalities and
the ländesbanken are owned not only by the states, but also by the regional
associations of municipal savings banks (sparkassen associations). There is also
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considerable cross ownership between the different ländesbanken.98 Nevertheless,
the close ties of public sector banks to the economic interests of the governments
that influence them remains a major reason why these banks do not always see
profit maximization as their paramount objective.
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Chapter Four: The Role of Central Banks in the German Banking
System and Economy: the Bundesbank (German central bank),
Ländeszentralbanken (ländes central banks) and the European
Central Bank.
European central banks “are complex institutions, which straddle the ground
between state and markets, politics and economics, and national, EU, transnational
and international governance.”99 Typically, a central bank is responsible for
monetary policy and maintaining the stability of the national currency. The control
of subsidized loan interest rates provides an essential tool for central banks to
maintain currency stability and control inflation. The setting of loan rates by a
central bank allows these banks to either tighten the availability of credit by setting
higher interest rates, which tends to strengthen the value of a currency and hold
down inflation, or to stimulate lending by lowering interest rates, which tends to
spur economic growth. Lower interest rates may, however, weaken a currency and
increase inflationary pressures. Central banks may also function as lenders of last
resort to “bailout” the banking sector in a financial crisis. Central banks may also
have supervisory powers over banks. However, unlike certain other central banks,
such as the Bank of England and the U.S. Federal Reserve, the Bundesbank and the
European Central Bank (ECB) are not lenders of last resort that are responsible for
maintaining the stability of the financial system. According to the Bundesbank Act
and the ECB Statute, the Bundesbank has four areas of primary responsibility, which
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it handles to a significant degree in coordination with the ECB. These main areas of
Bundesbank activity include: 1) Ensuring the circulation of cash, 2) Acting as a
“bankers bank” (functioning as a clearing house and providing banking
supervision), 3) Functioning as the state’s banker, and 4) Its role as the manager of
currency reserves.
Prior to 2002, with the physical advent of the euro currency, the Bundesbank
set the monetary policy for the Deutsche Mark, the currency of the Federal Republic
of Germany. The Bundesbank was the first central bank to be given full
independence from its government, creating the so‐called Bundesbank model of an
independent central bank. The European Central Bank (ECB) is responsible for the
monetary policy of the euro, which is, of course, the currency of the 15 member
countries of the Eurozone. The euro replaced the Deustche Mark in Germany in
2002. The ECB was established by the European Union on the model of the
Bundesbank as an independent central bank. Its headquarters is in Frankfurt,
Germany. With the advent of the ECB and the euro, the monetary policy functions of
the Bundesbank were taken over by the ECB.
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The Role of the Bundesbank and the Ländeszentralbanken

The original central bank plan for the German Federal Republic conformed to
the Allies’ aim to foster decentralized federal structures to break with the prior
unitary consolidation of power in Germany. “The precursor of today’s Bundesbank
was a creation of the Allied Military Governments. In each of the German Länder
(states), the American, British and French Authorities set up Ländeszentralbanken
(Länder central banks, or LCBs) in their zones of occupied Germany.”100 The British
also insisted that a federal central bank be established to coordinate the länder
central banks. This bank was referred to as the Bank deutscher Länder (BdL). The
BdL’s structures and powers were very similar to those of the Bundesbank that was
established by legislation in 1957 as the successor of the BdL. The legislation that
established the Bundesbank evoked a compromise in a debate at the time over
whether the German central bank should have autonomy from government control.
The legislation of 1957 established the independence of the Bundesbank from the
instructions of the federal government, but compromised by incorporating a
provision that the Bundesbank still generally support the economic policies of the
federal government as long as these policies did not prejudice its monetary and
oversight policies.101 The resulting Bundesbank has succeeded in functioning as
“one of the most independent central banks in the world, with a solid reputation for
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price stability.”102 Subsequently, with the adoption on the European Monetary
Union (with the euro as the currency), the Bundesbank’s responsibilities for setting
monetary and exchange‐rate policies shifted to the European Central Bank (ECB). In
fact, the ECB’s design, as well as its adoption of a conservative anti‐inflationary
policy, was modeled heavily on the Bundesbank.103
Over the years, the Bundesbank has been famous for its unswerving
campaign against inflation. These anti‐inflation policies were the overriding raison
d’être for the institution in the eyes of many Germans. Certainly, this can be
understood from the historical perspective of the hyperinflation that Germany
suffered after World War I and the return of virtually worthless German currency
for a time after world World War II. These events reduced the country’s economy to
a barter system or a black market economy based on foreign currency. These
monetary failures, particularly the hyperinflation after WW I when the currency
exchange rate went from 4.2 marks to the dollar before the WW I to more than 4
billion marks to the dollar in November 1923, had profound social and political
consequences.104 Most people were financially wiped out by this inflation and it
undermined the public confidence in the institutions of government, which helped
to push the country into the arms of the radical nationalist movement of the Nazi’s.
As the result, the “distinctive ethos” of the Bundesbank is a refusal to compromise
on inflation. “’There is no such thing as a little bit of inflation’, Bundesbank officials
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like to say…Even single digit inflation destroys a currency’s value over the medium
term and gradually destroys the economy as a whole”, according to the economic
policy directors of the Bundesbank.105 According to Kennedy, the Bundesbank
operates almost in a constitutive manner, although it is not truly a constitutional
branch like the judiciary, legislative or executive. The Bundesbank’s “norm of
monetary stability is [considered] more like a constitutional principle, such as
private property rights, than like a simple directive or order, such as the price of
postage.”106 The other objective of the bundesbank, the macroeconomic dimension
of monetary policy, particularly the trade‐off between monetary policy objectives
favoring price stability and those favoring economic growth, have always been
secondary to price and monetary stability at the bundesbank. The bundesbank has
been able to carryout its strict anti‐inflationary policy over the years primarily
because of its political independence. This political independence has usually,
although not always, allowed the bundesbank to hold to its anti‐inflationary policies
in the face of pressure from the federal government and international pressure from
sources such as the U.S. that have typically advocated pro‐growth bank policy (with
potential for inflation) in times of economic distress.
Before 2002, the main policymaking body of the Bundesbank was the Central
Bank Council (Zentralbankrat). The Central Bank Council (CBC) was comprised of
the presidents of the ländeszentralbanken (landes central banks, or LCBs) and the
Bundesbank Executive Board. The federal president appointed the LCB presidents
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at the suggestion of the Bundesrat (the upper house of the German parliament). The
Bundesrat based its recommendations for these posts, which were for eight‐year
terms, on proposals made by the LCB’s state government, in consultation with the
CBC. These presidents are often members of the party that is in power in the state
government at the time of their appointment, so in that sense they are initially
political appointments. They are, however, generally reelected for a second eight‐
year term until reaching retirement age (65‐67). The organization of the LCBs varies
by state, but the members of the LCB supervisory boards are generally drawn from
local businesses, banking, agriculture and trade unions. LCB presidents were
potentially able to advocate for regional or local interests at the Bundesbank in
Frankfurt, and could potentially influence the policies of the Central Bank Council.107
The Executive Board of the Bundesbank was eliminated by reforms of the
Bundesbank in 2002 to achieve a more centralized decision making structure, as
will be discussed below.
Public law restricts the transactions and dealings of ländes governments with
local banks except through their ländeszentralbank (LCB). LCBs act as local
administrative branches of the Bundesbank and continue to provide a degree of
decentralized (federalized), local power that has historically diffused some of the
central authority of the Bundesbank. Reforms enacted in 2002 strengthened the
central power of the Bundesbank, but according to some did not go far enough in
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de‐federalizing the authority of the Bundesbank.108 LCBs have central and branch
offices in their states. Credit divisions of LCBs administer credit operations under
the Bundesbank and European Central Bank interest policy. Banking divisions of
LCBs supervise local bank operations and report to the Bundesbank on any
irregularities in the banks of their state. The statistics division collects statistics, and
the economic division analyzes the economic conditions in their state and reports to
the LCB president. The LCD bond division supervises securities transactions and
credit needs. These LCBs, often through their Advisory Boards made up of local
appointees from various economic sectors, provide feed‐back and act as local
“listening posts” for the Bundesbank in the provinces, injecting some degree of
(unelected) local representation into the Bundesbank’s structure.109
In 2002 the Bundesbank was reformed to streamline its governance
structure. This restructuring was also aimed at increasing the central authority of
the Bundesbank by limiting the number of LCBs and state‐based decision makers in
the Bundesbank’s Central Bank Council, thereby making the decision making
process of the Bundesbank more efficient. That same year the Bundesbank also lost
its monetary policy authority to the European Central Bank with the advent of the
euro. At the Bundesbank, the Central Bank Council was replaced by an new eight
person Executive Board that became the supreme governing body of the
Bundesbank. The Executive Board members include four members (or half of the
board) who are nominated by the federal government and appointed by the federal
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president. The other four Board members are nominated by the Bundesrat and
appointed by the federal president. The Bundesrat nominations represented a
concession to the states to mitigate an increase in central power resulting of an all‐
federal appointed board.
The second reform of the Bundesbank involved a consolidation in the bodies
that supervise financial services (including banking, securities, and insurance
services) into one body called the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority
(Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, or BaFin). This single regulator
replaced the supervisory functions of three previously existing federal authorities
that dealt separately with each of these three financial sectors. A protocol was
issued to clarify the relations of the Bundesbank to the BaFin, specifying the
competencies of the Bundesbank in banking supervision. The European Central
Bank supported this expansion of the supervisory function of the Bundesbank as a
means to strengthen the stability of the financial system. It was felt that these
regulatory reforms would “increase the competitiveness and attractiveness of
Germany as a financial center [by] providing an improved regulatory framework.”110
The functions of the Bundesbank , as noted above, include ensuring the
physical circulation of cash. For example, it checks the deliveries of cash by banks
and transport companies and removes counterfeit and damaged notes from
circulation, etc. The bundesbank also supports cross‐boarder payments between
German domestic commercial banks and foreign commercial banks. In addition, the
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Bundesbank also functions as a “banks’ banker” and acts with the ECB as a
refinancing source for the commercial banks. This refinancing is used to cover the
needs of the banks for central bank funds (through the Bundesbank and the ECB).
By controlling the money supply by this method, the Bundesbank historically helped
maintain price stability. Since 1999, establishing the policies for control of this
money supply function shifted to the ECB. The Bundesbank also acts as a banker for
the state, providing banking services for federal, state, and local authorities and
statutory social security organizations, but all such accounts must have a positive
balance, as the Bundesbank cannot grant credit to the public sector. The
Bundesbank also is legally obliged to advise the government on monetary policy and
it prepares position papers for the government.111 The Bundesbank also holds non‐
euro denominated currency reserves, including gold reserves and securities in
foreign currency.
Since 2002, as noted above, the Bundesbank and the BaFin have agreed to a
division of regulatory supervisory duties that leaves the Bundesbank responsible for
most of the operational tasks of banking supervision. The BaFin supervises the large
public and private banks, including the ländesbanken, whereas the Bundesbank
mainly supervises the savings and cooperative banks and small private banks.112
After the advent of the European Monetary Union and the shift of monetary policy to
the ECB, the Bundesbank has attempted to carve out an enhanced policy role by
increasing its supervisory duties into the entire financial sector, but it has only
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partially succeeded in this endeavor through a “gentlemen’s agreement” with the
BaFin that divides up supervisory duties in the financial sector between BaFin and
the Bundesbank. This agreement left the Bundesbank with only partial
responsibility for regulating the banking sector, with the BaFin responsible for
supervision of most of the rest of the financial sector.113

The Role of the European Central Bank

The European Central Bank (ECB), established in 1998, is an extraordinary
supranational banking institution necessitated by the voluntary ceding of monetary
sovereignty that resulted in the sharing of a single currency, the euro, over the 15
states that currently make up the eurozone. The adaption of the euro represents the
first time since the Roman Empire that a large part of Europe has shared a single
currency. With the realization of this Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the
participating eurozone countries, including Germany, no longer have their own
sovereignty over their monetary policy, with this policy now delegated to the ECB.
The Bundesbank, therefore, no longer makes monetary policy for Germany. While
the ECB makes these policy decisions, the national central banks of the member
countries (including the Bundesbank) still play a role in collectively deciding on
these decisions through the Governing Council of the ECB. This Council is modeled
after the federal governing structures of the Bundesbank, which had to
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accommodate the input of the ländeszentalbaken (LCBs) in setting Bundesbank
policy. Like the Central Council of the old Bundesbank governing structure, the
Governing Council of the ECB is also made up of “regional” central banks; but, in this
case, the regional central banks are the central banks from each of the ECBs member
countries, represented by the governors of these banks. In addition to the governors
of the national central banks of the eurozone member countries, the Governing
Council consists of the Executive Board (again analogous to the Bundesbank
structure). This Executive Board of the ECB Governing Council is made up of the
president, vice present, and four other members. The ECB, together with the
national central banks, including the Bundesbank, make up the European System of
Central Banks (ESCB).114 Like the Bundesbank, particularly before the Bundesbank’s
governance reforms of 2002, the ECB and the ESCB system have been criticized for
being too decentralized with too much power left in the hands of the national
central banks. Therefore, the national central banks of the ESCB remain significant
players in the eurosystem.115
The ECB’s independence, governance structure, and functions were laid
down in the international Treaty on European Union, also known as the Maastricht
Treaty. The ECB’s primary objective is specified in this treaty as price stability. The
ECB primary objective of price stability, like its governance structure, is also
adapted from the Bundesbank, as was spelled out for the Bundesbank at its
founding in 1957. The ECB and ESCB implement the monetary policy of the
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eurozone in accordance with this objective of price stability (the holding down of
inflation). While the ESCB does conduct foreign exchange operations and holds and
manages eurozone foreign reserves while facilitating the payment systems, overall
competencies in exchange‐rate policies are shared between the monetary
authorities of the ESCB and the political authorities. The ECB has the exclusive right
to authorize the issuance of bank notes for the eurozone. Unlike many other central
banks, including the Bundesbank, the ECB/ESCB does not have direct responsibility
for banking supervision. However, the Maastricht treaty does specify that the ESCB
contribute to “the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities
relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the
financial system” (Article 105.5).116
The Maastricht Treaty also grants the ECB political independence from
politicians in legal terms by prohibiting the ECB from taking orders from politicians.
From a political prospective, this is reinforced by the appointment of Executive
Board members for eight‐year non‐renewable terms. These single eight year terms
serve to insulate appointees from political pressures, since they do not have to
worry about politicians reappointing them.117 Of course, this does not mean that
politics have no influence on the policies of the ECB, whose Governing Council is
made up largely of the governors (presidents) of the central banks of eurozone
countries. For example, as was pointed out in the Economist, “The Governing Council
[of the ECB] is supposed to set interest rates according to the conditions in the euro
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area as a whole, but…national [central bank] governors [are] influenced by
conditions in their home country…. A weak centre, combined with strong national
interests, could create conflicts that undermine the whole system’s credibility.”118
This argument is similar to the argument for a stronger central (federal)
influence in the governance of the Bundesbank. The desire for stronger central
control of the Bundesbank first led to a reduction of the number of ländesbanken on
the old Bundesbank Central Bank Council (CBC), and then the elimination of the
supreme authority granted to this council and the investment of this authority in the
Executive Board appointed by the German federal president, beginning in 2002. In
the case of the Bundesbank, the overriding objective of price stability still generally
prevailed, despite the influence of the ländesbanken in the CBC over the years. The
overall adherence to the policy objective of price stability by the ECB seems to be
holding, although as the number of member countries continue to increase in the
future, with a resulting increase in the number of national central bank governors
on the ECB’s Governing Council, the possibility of the governing power of the ECB
shifting to the “periphery” and away from the center remains. The codification of
price stability as the central purpose of ECB monetary policy in the Maastricht
Treaty makes it likely that price stability will continue to direct the common
monetary policy of the ECB, despite the presence of the national central bankers on
the Governing Council who might at times favor pro‐growth policies based on the
local economic conditions in their countries. During the time that the Bundesbank
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operated under an analogous decentralized governance structure, adherence to the
overriding policy of price stability typically prevailed, with a few exceptions.
Presumably, the same will hold for the ECB, although evolutionary reform of ECB
governing institutions is inevitable over time, as was the case for the governance
institutions of the Bundesbank.
As noted above, the ECB has no significant supervisory authority over
European banks, but only a supervisory monitoring role supported by the ECB’s
Banking Supervision Committee. Europe’s financial stability system is based at the
national level and there is little supervisory authority or leverage at the European
level. Efforts have been made to orient national banking stability structures to
accommodate pan‐European banks that operate outside their country of origin,
across Europe and further abroad. Despite the traditional focus of German banks on
their domestic market, German banks have also increased their international
investments, including the publically owned ländesbanken. The ländesbanken, as
well as German commercial banks, have taken on investment banking activities
abroad in an effort to increase profits. Unfortunately, the nationally based bank
regulatory structures in Europe lag behind this increase in cross‐border banking
activity.
This lag in European supervisory and regulatory strength has occurred
despite efforts such as the European Commission’s 1999 Financial Services Action
Plan and the so‐called Lamafalussy framework for financial rule making that
brought together all European banking supervisors and agencies into the Committee
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of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) in 2004. Unfortunately, “the interlocking
of many national sources of authority has also created complexity and blurred the
lines of responsibility for supervision and crisis management. [Furthermore,] CEBS
is an advisory body, with no decision‐making powers.”119 The supervisory
framework for regulating the pan‐European and international banking activities of
European (including German) banks is a spider web of national authorities,
including the 51 members of CEBS. This system has not been tested in a pan‐
European banking crisis. “No national or European authority presently has routine
access to supervisory information on all pan‐European banks...”120
As German and other European banks increasingly internationalize their
business operations, German and other nation‐based European banking regulatory
authorities become less able to deal with financial crises on a national basis. As we
have seen, the European Central Bank (ECB) does not adequately address this
function because it lacks regulatory authority. This need has not gone unnoticed.
“Since its creation the ECB has tried to expand its supervisory tasks, but has met
with the resistance of the national central banks, the national supervisory
authorities and member states’ governments.”121
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Chapter Five: A Cross‐Country Comparison of the Performance of
German Banks to the Banks of other European Countries
At first glance, Germany’s banking system appears unique and
therefore difficult to directly compare to the banking systems of other countries.
The German banking system is more fragmented and German banks play a more
extensive role in stimulating and influencing the regional and national economies
than do the banking systems in other countries of similar size. As already noted, the
aims of Germany’s semi‐public and co‐operative banks do not always correlate with
achieving maximum profit, as is the accepted common goal of other Western banks.
Instead, German public banks are often said to function as a development asset to
their local governments and by providing aid to domestic business by offering
ample investment at favorable interest rates that spurs the long‐term growth of
their German corporate business “partners.” Through these functions, the banks
foster the wellbeing of the German economy, but are said to be willing to forgo high
rates of return. Furthermore, banks in Germany play a much more prominent role in
the German economy as a whole than do their counter parts in liberal market
economic systems such as the U.K. or U.S. where corporate debt securities and stock
market capitalization play much larger role. However, if we stay within the
eurozone, it is not hard to find reasonable comparators for the German Banking
system.
Banks play a similar high profile role in the social market economies of other
eurozone countries as they do in the German economy when measured as the ratio
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of the banks’ total assets to GDP, or in bank loans to GDP. This ratio of bank loans to
GDP is three times higher in both the eurozone and in Germany as it is in the U.S.,
which is dominated by its securities markets.122 The similar prominence of banks in
the economies of other European countries of similar size to Germany, such as Italy,
Spain and France, and even the U.K. makes a cross‐country performance comparison
of the German banking system relevant. These European countries also have
roughly similar macroeconomic conditions and institutional frameworks.
Although the structure and roles of banks in these comparator countries is
similar, the German banks still do play a larger role in the German economy than the
banks in the comparator countries if assessed by other measures. German banks
typically provide a higher number of larger sized loans to non‐financial sector
borrowers, and these loans have longer maturities (with the bulk of these loans in
excess of five years) than do the banks in the comparator countries.123 There are
also many more banks operating in Germany than in the other comparator
countries, although German bank employment is not significantly higher than in the
other countries if normalized to total banking assets or loan levels.124 In line with
the high total number of banks in Germany, the typical bank manages a smaller
amount of assets than does a typical bank in the comparator countries, with the
exception of Italy.125 The median size of assets of German banks across almost all
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pillars is less than half that in any of the other countries. There is also less
concentration of total bank assets in the five largest banks in Germany, which hold a
lower percentage of their country’s total bank assets, as compared to the relative
percentage of total bank assets held by the five largest institutions in each of the
other countries.126 Given the large presence of publically owned banks and
cooperative banks in Germany, it is not surprising that incorporated, joint stock
commercial banks account for a lower percentage of bank system assets in Germany
than they do in the other countries. In Germany, these banks account for about 25%
of banking assets, whereas similar incorporated commercial banks account for 50%
or more of assets.127
In Germany, all pillars of the banking system post lower profits than do
similar banks of other countries. The private commercial banks in Germany earn
particularly low returns. Over 20% of these banks earned less than or equal return
for their owners than the rate of return on risk‐free treasury bills in the years of
1997, 1999, and 2001, for example. The public savings banks and the cooperative
banks in Germany were more profitable than German commercial banks.128 The
average return on assets (ROA) for German banks was only about 20% of those for
the banks in other European countries.129 Low returns reflect the fact that the banks
in Germany seem to charge only modest interest rates even when the risk is deemed
high. Elsas and Krahnen showed that the risk premiums charged by German banks
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(the interest difference charged to a customer for a high default risk loan compared
to a low default risk loan) was only 94 basis points (.94%).130 In the 1990s, the
German post‐unification boom in banking business volume relating to construction
lending buoyed German bank profits in the 1990s despite these low margins, but
since the millennium, German bank profits have particularly lagged compared to
other countries.
The low profitability of German banks also seems to be in good part because
German banks have been poor in developing sources of non‐interest revenue
compared to the banks in other countries. This lack of alternative revenue
development reflects the more limited engagement of German banks in
nontraditional bank business activities compared to the banks in other countries.131
Interestingly, this cross‐country comparison showed that the public savings banks
and cooperative banks, which would be presumed to have the least interest in
maximizing profits, do not operate with higher costs.132 Overall bank competition in
Germany was deemed to be more intense than in the U.K. or France, but not
compared to Italy or Spain. The reasons for the low profitability of German banks
was summarized by Brunner, et al as being only partly due to high competition
among German banks and the presence of public banks that did not always seek to
maximize profits. Low profitability was system wide and appeared to largely result
from wide spread under pricing of risk and a low proportion of high value added
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activities due to less innovation throughout all the pillars of the German banking
sector.133
In summary, Brunner et al in their International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Occasional Paper 233 draw eight main points from a cross‐country comparison of
the German banking system to the banking systems in other European countries.134
First, banking involvement in the German economy is more extensive than in the
comparator countries, even though banks also play prominent roles in the
economies of comparator countries. Second, German banks are comparatively small
and private shareholders play a limited role in the capitalization and control of
German banks. Thirdly, the German banking system is weaker than other European
countries if assessed according to profitability, even though German banks wield
more influence within the German economy than other banking systems exert on
their country’s economies. The profitability of German banks is lower in part
because public banks may tend to forgo some profit in working for the public good
of their states and municipalities, which allows the banks to be concerned with long‐
term investment and the greater economic good, rather than short‐term
profitability. In return, state guarantees for banks helps ensure stability. Since
World War II, Germany has not witnessed a major national banking crisis.
The fourth point made by Brunner et al is that each of the banking segments
within the three pillars of German banks underperforms their closest counterpart
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banks in other countries of comparable size. Fifth, the lack of profitability is due to
weaker revenues. Relatively weak revenue is a constant throughout all the pillars of
German banking when compared to the counterpart banks of other countries. This
reflects an apparent cultural tendency to accept lower rates of returns relative to
risk compared to the banks of other countries. This tendency to accept lower
revenues occurs throughout all pillars of German banking and is not limited to
public banks. Sixth, the IMF considers the problem within the German banking
system to be structural rather than cyclical. Seventh, the sparkassen (public savings
banks) and the cooperative banks out performance the commercial banks, but when
compared to equivalent bank pillars in other countries, they also under perform to
the same relative degree as the German commercial banks. Eighth, and lastly, low
profitability of German banks is a characteristic throughout all pillars of the German
banking system compared to the banks of other countries. No significant difference
in relative profitability is apparent between the public and private sector banks.135
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Chapter Six: Structural Adaptation Pressures on the German
Banking System Exerted by the Global Financial Market

Ulrich Ramm, the executive vice president of Commerzbank, Germany’s
fourth largest commercial bank, somewhat facetiously claimed that “Germany has
the largest public‐sector banking market behind North Korea.”136 In an environment
of increased global competition with the accompanying international investment
opportunities and risks, a natural question arises as to whether the German
government should remain the owner of a large portion of German banks. This
question is particularly relevant following the termination of the statutory
guarantees of public sector bank investments in 2005, a change that was forced on
the German Banking system by the European Commission. This means that public
sector banks now face higher costs in the capital markets, even though these costs
may still be somewhat protected by the fact that these banks remain publically
owned. Higher costs of capital for these institutions will lower profit margins still
further and will ultimately undermine the ability of these banks to invest in projects
that may have lower rates of return but are of high public interest. Even before the
loss of public guarantees, the profit margins of German banks were already
comparatively low, as noted above. Without government guarantees and cheap
capital, the public banks need to obtain a market return on their capital
investments.
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At the time that the public guarantees expired, on July 18, 2005, pundits
predicted that the ländesbanken would be “increasingly exposed to the fierce wind
of competition, and not all of them may be able to survive.”137 In anticipation, some
of the banks were already joining forces, such as mergers between the
ländesbanken of Baden‐Württemberg and Rhineland‐Palatinate, as well as the
banks of Kiel and Hamburg, for example. Gerhard Schröder, the German chancellor
at the time, predicted that only three ländesbanken might be left in the long run.138
This degree of voluntary consolidation did not take place, however. Such
consolidation is limited by länder‐specific laws that govern ländesbanken and
sparkassen. These banks are limited in their business plans not only by the bank
regulation laws of their länder (states), but also by the fact that local public officials
often have seats on the boards of their ländesbanken. Therefore, mergers and
integration plans face both regulatory and political challenges.
German banking laws hinder the consolidation of both public and private
sector German banks. Such consolidation would theoretically increase the economic
efficiency and financial prowess of German banks and help them compete against
larger competitors in the international banking world. Private banks cannot, by law,
buy public banks, although the law does allow public banks to buy private banks.
With few exceptions, German banking law has not allowed states and municipalities
to sell off or privatize public institutions. Furthermore, strict labor laws and strong
unions in Germany drive up the costs of laying‐off employees made redundant by
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mergers. Since consolidating the workforce after a merger is a major factor in
achieving increased efficiency, the high costs off lay‐offs in Germany can be a deal
killer that continues to prevent German bank consolidations, despite the fact that
analyses, such as outlined in Chapter 5, continue to show that Germany is “over
banked.”
The relatively small size of German banks, with each bank typically having
fewer assets than comparator banks in other European countries, also makes
growth by acquiring banks in other European countries difficult for German banks.
The small relative size of German banks compared to foreign rivals is also true for
private commercial banks as well as public banks in Germany. According to Ulrich
Ramm, “As consolidation goes on in our neighboring countries, their banks are
becoming larger and larger. That makes them difficult targets for us. Perhaps we are
easier targets for them.”139 The plentitude of German consumer banks of relatively
small size that results from the three pillar German banking system creates a
fragmented but competitive market, particularly in areas such as commercial
banking where banks from the different pillars compete with each other. The
relatively high competition level faced by German banks, as well as their small size,
contributes to low profits and acts as a disincentive for foreign banks to acquire or
merge with German banks. When Italy’s Unicredit took over Munich‐based
HypoVereinsbank, Germany’s second largest private bank, in 2005, they
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subsequently reported that their acquired German subsidiary had lower profits than
the rest of Unicredit because of “a particularly competitive market.”140

The Pros and Cons of Public Sector banking

In Chapter 3 we considered the role of German Banks in the economy. This
analysis suggested that the existence of public sector banks may afford special
advantages to the German economy, for example by allowing public banks to
provide patient, low cost capital to foster the growth of small and medium sized
firms. This is possible because public banks do not have to maximize short‐term
profit. This hausbank function requires long‐term trusting relationships with firms
that include the sharing of insider information between client firms and their banks
that may not be possible in a shareholder economy in which such information would
breed corruption and lead to questions about a bank’s long‐term investment returns
that could scuttle such deals. While this argument may apply to the sparkassen that
grant most of their loans to small local firms, such loans make up a relatively small
percentage of ländesbank loans (about 20%). Ländesbanken actually devote twice
this amount to loans made to foreign companies.141 These foreign loans presumably
serve no long‐term benefit to German firms, other than providing the ländesbanken
with profits or losses that affect their ability to make new loans.
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Another argument used to support public banks is that public banks
(principally the sparkassen) provide consumers with increased access to financial
services such as checking and free savings accounts, as well as reasonably priced
loans, that they would not have access to if they had to deal only with large
“monopolist” banks. A report on banking services in the U.K., the Cruickshank report
of 2000, has been used to back this claim.142 This report shows that fewer Britons
have a checking account and that there is a relative shortage of loans available to
small business and that Britons are more heavily in debt compared to Germans.
From the German perspective, profits at the large British “monopoly” banks “are
outrageously high.”143 While the sparkassen do provide good access to consumer
and small business financial services, the need for them to be publically owned in
order to provide these services remains doubtful, according to Brunner et al in their
IMF occasional paper analysis, since the government could mandate the provision of
such services and even tender a subsidy to deliver such services, if need be, without
resorting to public bank ownership.144
The potential benefit provided by public banks, such as the ländesbanken,
that take on public projects with a greater public service return than a private
monetary return is used to support the need for public banks to act as “development
banks”. Specific government development banks do exist in Germany, as noted
above, but are only a relatively small part of the public banking system. These
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development functions are reasonable reasons for the existence of the development
banks, but could be separated from the sparkassen and ländesbanken, which have
more limited roles as local development banks. It is possible to eliminate the dual
role of ländesbanken as both “private” banking business providers and public
development banks, for example. Some länder have already separated these
functions from their ländesbanken to a significant degree145 and this goal has been
part of public banking policy since the reforms that followed the bank crisis of 1931.
This argument cannot be used to justify the extensive public sector presence in the
German banking market.
The German public sector banks have, perhaps, managed to sustain credit
flows during some economic downturns, such as during the recession in the early
years after the millennium that followed the bursting of the American “dot com
bubble” when contractions in the availability of private sector capital spread across
the Atlantic. During this time, public sector banks in Germany were able to expand
their granting of credit to companies, unlike the downsizing that occurred in their
private sector counterparts. This may have had some buffering role on the cyclical
effects of this recession.146
The down side of German public banking includes the market distortion that
comes with government subsidy that renders these banks potentially less efficient,
as seen in part by their lower profit margins. Some of the poor profits of the public
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banks reflect less innovation in expanding into non‐traditional sources of revenue,
compared to their European rivals, for example. The overall revenue of the German
public banks is also significantly lower than their counter parts in other countries.
As noted above, this likely also reflects the poor pricing of loans. Ultimately, if return
on investments is inadequate, a cycle of government dependence is created in order
to sustain operations. With a phasing out of the government guarantees, and threats
from the European Commission regarding still other German public bank benefits
that are under scrutiny as anti‐competitive, the status quo is not sustainable.
Public banks are being forced to increase their revenue and increase their
profits. This pressure left German banks vulnerable as some ländesbanken, for
example, sought to increase their return through increased foreign investments,
particularly the securitized sub‐prime mortgage instruments that caused the
banking crisis that is currently threatening the German banking system. When the
government is there to pick up the losses, public bank executives may feel that their
institution is not responsible for losses, only for gains. Under such conditions, public
bank executives may more easily turn into gamblers. Even before the current sub‐
prime crisis, there have been a number of such “gambling” scandals perpetrated by
some ländesbanken. For example, “Munich‐based BayernLB did it with stocks in
Singapore, Bankgesellschaft Berlin with real estate investments [in the immediate
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post‐unification real estate bubble of the early 1990’s] and WestLB with holdings in
British companies.”147 All required government bailouts.
The example of the Bankgesellschaft Berlin real estate scandal is a cautionary
example on the pitfalls of semi‐privatization. The State of Berlin created the
Bankgesellschaft when it rolled its Ländesbank Berlin and public mortgage bank, the
Berlin Hypo, into a consolidated joint stock corporation that also included the state’s
holdings in a commercial bank, the Berliner Bank. Poor management exacerbated by
political entanglements caused major losses when the post unification real estate
bubble burst. The State of Berlin had to bail out this semi‐privatized version of its
ländesbank with an initial sum of 1.73 billion euro, said to represent 2.3 percent of
the Berlin GDP, and this still left Berlin on the hook for future losses.148 As Brunner
tells us, this example shows that simply turning a public bank, such as a ländesbank,
into a joint stock corporation operating under private law, and perhaps under less
public scrutiny, does not free the government of its public ownership obligations.149
Of course, the same problem can occur when a large private bank fails, even
if that bank has no history of government ownership. In any number of national
financial systems, such a bank may be deemed “too big to fail” and the government
may elect to bail it out to circumvent the catastrophic collapse of multiple financial
institutions that might follow in a domino effect. Certainly, such problems are not
unique to the German financial system. This problem was recently highlighted by
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the U.S. Federal Reserve‐provided guarantees for the bailout of Bear Sterns, which,
of course, is not a traditional bank, but a securities firm and investment bank. The
recent German government bailouts of state owned banks necessitated by the
current sub‐prime mortgage investment debacle are discussed in the next chapter.
In theory, “financial systems that feature stronger competition, greater
diversity, and closer integration among intermediaries are more likely to direct
finance to its most productive use. In such systems, flows of finance are more closely
guided by financial signals, and financial resources are more competitively
priced.”150 This premise tends to assume a diverse, privatized and sophisticated
financial system and is used to support innovative investment markets that provide
new financial instruments that increase the availability of credit by attempting to
spreads the risk. Such innovation has been lacking in the German banking system,
which has been faulted in failing to expand into areas other than traditional interest
bearing loans. The current financial crisis, in which innovative American investment
instruments such as asset‐backed securities and collateralized debt obligations
sustained huge losses in the sub‐prime mortgage meltdown, has shown us that with
such innovation comes considerable risk. The “ideal” of a highly innovative, private
financial services industry creates challenges to private and public prudential
arrangements that must oversee such a sophisticated financial system, as the
current financial crisis demonstrates.
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A more sophisticated financial system requires greater transparency with the
open sharing of financial data so that regulators and buyers of financial instruments
can effectively assess their risks. The German financial system has typically
provided less sophisticated credit through traditional lending. The present German
system has grown up based on an insider network of industries and banks that fails
to provide adequate transparency for more sophisticated and potentially riskier
investments. Despite the internal “controls” provided by insider information within
German industry, this insider network was of no help as German banks increased
their investments abroad and bought into derivativized mortgage instruments and
other such investments in which their insider knowledge of the German economy
was of no help. Prudential frameworks must keep up with any change in the
financial market as the German (or any other) financial system evolves if the risk of
financial crises is to be minimized.

Can Public Sector Banks be privatized?

Other European countries, particularly Sweden and Austria, previously had
large public sector banking systems similar to Germany’s and in some cases even
larger than Germany’s. For example, France, Italy, Spain, Austria, and Sweden all had
three pillar banking systems similar to the structure of Germany’s, with savings
banks, cooperatives, and commercial banks. Some of these country’s banks were
under even greater public control than the German public banks because up until
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the mid‐1980’s some of these governments also owned major commercial banks. In
the 1980’s and 1990’s these countries undertook major banking divestment
programs, particularly following the economic slow‐down of the early 1990’s. These
reforms typically followed a path of consolidation through mergers and the
divestment of the states holdings in the commercial banks. Several countries
required or allowed their publically held savings banks to form joint stock
corporations, while France transformed them into cooperatives. Although these
divestments and consolidations appear to have resulted in more competitive
banking systems, these countries retain significant public sector control in the
governance of savings banks through foundations or “golden shares”.151 The
changes that have taken place in the banking systems of these neighboring countries
appear to have strengthened the competitiveness of their banking systems, as
compared to that of the German system, by lessening their dependence on the public
banking sector.
Italy’s transformation of its relatively undersized bank and public sector
dominated financial market through a large scale privatization program in the
1990’s has led to a more efficient and less concentrated Italian banking sector.152
Many of the privatized Italian banks are listed on the stock exchange, making it
possible for these Italian Banks to raise capital from a diverse source of investors.
This has increased the degree of market‐based discipline in the Italian financial
system. The increase in non‐bank intermediation brought on by the Italian reforms
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required a boost to the legal and regulatory frameworks of Italy to maintain
investor confidence.153 The same is true for the financial system reforms that have
taken place in other European countries and which may take place in Germany. The
results of privatization of public sector banks in other European countries suggests
that similar moves are possible in Germany and will likely be expedited by EU
policies and enforced by the European Commission, as we have already seen. Such
reform of the German banking system will increasingly bring German banking into
line with banking systems in the rest of Europe and will aid cross border banking
integration in Europe and the expansion of Pan‐European banks, whose activities
span several countries. If the German system eventually embraces such reforms,
German banks will be in a better position to take part and lead such efforts, likely
through consolidations and the freeing up of regional public ties that bind much of
the German financial sector. This may allow the creation of German “champion”
banks that can lead in the global arena, as well as in Europe.
Since most of European banking regulation remains nationally based in the
home countries of its banks, increased Pan‐European (and international) banking
will increasingly require cross‐boarder stability frameworks and greater EU
regulation of banks.154 The EU must consider this need for cross boarder bank
regulation and stability frameworks as part of European banking reform if it is to
have credibility in calling for the reforms of the financial systems in specific member
states, such as the European Commission‐applied pressure on the German system.
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Chapter Seven: The German Banking System Under Stress: State‐
Owned Banks on the Verge of Collapse from the U.S. Sub‐Prime
Mortgage Meltdown

International financial markets are currently in a crisis precipitated by huge
financial sector losses and a resulting credit squeeze that has been extraordinary in
its magnitude and global reach. This crisis has affected financial systems across the
globe, but primarily in the financial markets of advanced economies whose financial
institutions invested in so‐called structured finance instruments and related credit
derivatives backed by U.S. sub‐prime mortgages undone by the bursting of the U.S.
housing bubble. This shock drained the interbank money markets of liquidity
following the realization that complex derivatives backed by packaged U.S.
mortgages were grossly overvalued and of much higher risk than their investment
ratings had suggested. European banks that had invested in these instruments for
their relatively high yield and presumed safety now found themselves holding
virtually worthless commercial paper. Uncertainty of the size and scope of the
resulting losses has magnified the shock to the banking industry. The market for
Mortgage asset‐backed commercial paper (bonds) (ABCP) and derivative
investment paper (bonds) based on ABCPs dried up, forcing huge write downs by
European and American banks, and other banks across the world, including in
Germany.
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The securities that created the problem are examples of “innovative”
financial instruments that have been touted as the hallmark of a sophisticated
financial system that can devise such means to expand the pool of credit; the
American securities market. The crisis precipitated by the collapse in the value of
these instruments shows what happens when such innovation runs amok, with the
bursting of a credit bubble created by the existence of these instruments.

How Sub‐prime Loans Became “High‐Grade” Investments.

Roger Lowenstein, in the New York Times Mgazine, describes the process of
creating so called high‐grade investments out of a pool of sub‐prime mortgage loans.
155

These pooled, or grouped, loans were made up from loans extended to

borrowers with relatively poor credit histories. Lowenstein describes an example of
a bundle of 2,393 mortgage loans issued by a West Coast non‐bank lending company
under conditions that prevailed at the height of the recent U.S. housing and
mortgage bubble. The individual loans that made up this pool were typically issued
under liberalized terms that often required no money down so that the borrower
had no “skin” invested in the loan. Unlike banks that tend to know their loan
customers, these lending companies often failed to verify the income reported by
borrowers. As these lenders vied for increased shares of the loan business, they
typically promoted adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) with low “teaser” interest
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rates and payment amounts, even though these loans stipulate sharp increases in
interest rates (and therefore increases in the payments required to service the
loans) in the periods after the loans are issued. Such marginal borrowers will
predictably not to be able to afford the higher rates on their ARMs, but the
assumption by borrower and lender alike was that the lenders would subsequently
be able to refinance on better terms because the value of their houses would
continue to rise, thereby increasing their equity and qualifying them for better
terms on refinance loans. As Lowenstein points out, “This is the classic sign of a
bubble—lending on the belief, or the hope, that new money will bail out the old.”156
The mortgage issuing company could continue to make such loans because
they could bundle them for sale as securities (ABCPs) by taking them to a New York
investment bank that would subdivide the loans into pools of loans, or investment
vehicles, that would “predictably” spread the rate of defaults among different pools
of loans based on historical statistical data on loan default rates. These statistics
presumably allowed for calculations of the risks and yields of the pooled loans, or
vehicle. These pools of loans could then be sold to investors as bonds, returning
profit and capital to the mortgage lender. A flaw in this reasoning is that that any
statistical prediction is only as good as the data on which it is based. Valid
predictions require that the predictive statistical data must be based on loans that
were made under the same conditions as the new loans. This was a fatal flaw. The
freewheeling conditions under which new loans were issued at the peak of the
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housing bubble had little in common with the more standard lending conditions that
prevailed when the comparator loans were issued. Statistics based on these
historical comparator loans were, therefore, unlikely to predict the performance of
these new loans, made to borrowers under considerably different conditions that
included no money down (compared to requirements of 25% down on the
comparator loans), borrowers with lower credit scores, and borrowers who were
buying property for speculation in an overheated market.
Nevertheless, these loans were bundled and then presented to a credit rating
agency such as Moody’s, who analyzed the loan package based on these statistics
and assigned a credit rating to the package. The credit rating company then received
payment from the lender for its credit rating service, creating a conflict of interest
that some say predisposed the agencies to grant these vehicles higher than deserved
credit ratings.157 These loans were then used to issue bonds to the so called “special‐
purpose vehicle” (SPV), which is a ghost corporation that “purchases” the specific
pool of mortgages. This SPV then issues bonds to investors that are backed by the
pool of mortgages that it owns. The SPV then uses the monthly mortgage payments
to cover the required dividend payments to its bondholders, unless it is unable to do
so because of an excess of defaults within the mortgage pool (vehicle). Since the
pool is made up of mostly B grade (sub‐investment grade) mortgages, the
investment bank and the credit agency must be able to somehow turn this poor
quality investment (the SPV) into investment grade (e.g. AAA) rated bonds so that
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institutional investors, such as banks, can buy them—otherwise the bonds would
not be generally marketable. This was done by floating 12 classes of bonds backed
by the same pool (vehicle) of mortgages. These bonds varied from triple A to a lowly
Ba1.
Although the differently rated bonds were backed by the same loans,
different bond ratings were rationalized based on a differential priority for
repayment. The higher rated bonds have first priority on the cash received from the
mortgage holders (the home owners) until they are fully paid, then the next tier of
bonds get priority, and then the next tier until all the bonds are repaid. The low
rated bonds at the bottom of the pile give their investors the highest interest rates,
but if the homeowners default, they are the first to absorb the loss. If the calculated
percentage of defaults turned out significantly higher than predicted, the higher‐
grade bondholders also stand to lose. This stratified, or “structured,” financial
vehicle can be compared to a “seaside condo beset by flooding: just as the penthouse
will not get wet until the lower floors are thoroughly soaked, so the triple‐A bonds
would not lose a dime unless the lower credits were wiped out.”158 These structured
financial vehicles allowed sub‐prime loans to be sold as investments, thereby
making more capital available to lenders to make new loans. However, under the
wrong economic conditions, or if the predictive calculations on default rates are
wrong, the entire investment may go under. This is exactly what happened to these
investments.
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For the sample pool of loans (vehicle) cited by Lowenstein, Moody’s (the
private credit rating agency) estimated that the default rate would be 4.9%. The
lowest rated bonds would be covered if the loss rate did not exceed 7.25%. Within 6
months of the 2006 issuance of this particular vehicle, 6% of the mortgages in the
vehicle were in default. By 2007, 13% of these mortgages were in default, with the
default rate rising by the month. This example is typical; many of these mortgage
vehicles had even higher default rates. Clearly, those who invested in these
mortgage‐backed bonds lost money, even those who bought the higher rated,
structured bonds based on the same mortgages as the low rated bonds.
The issuing of stratified bonds with different ratings, despite the fact that all
the bonds were backed by the same assets (the same sub‐prime mortgages), was not
the investment bank’s final convolution for turning sub‐prime “lead” into gold. The
original mortgage backed security, described above, was used to back even more
esoteric investment vehicles called collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs. CDOs
were also financed by issuing similar “ladders” of bonds that were rated by the
credit agency from triple‐A on down. The CDO bonds were not backed directly by
the original pool of loans, but rather by the bonds (paper) that were issued by the
original SPV. Such a CDO is called a second‐order derivative. (The bonds of the
original mortgage backed SPV were the first‐order derivative investment bonds,
directly backed by the mortgages.) There were even third‐order derivative
investments, known as CDOs squared, which bought bonds issued by other CDOs.
There was no way for investors to determine the quality of the mortgage assets that
backed the initial SPV, other than the highly calculated ratings provided by the
88

credit rating agencies. This lack of transparency becomes extreme when trying to
assess the quality of the collateralized bonds that backed the CDOs.159

The Worst German Financial Crisis Since 1931?

A number of German banks, including ländesbanken, heavily invested in
securities backed by U.S. sub‐prime assets. For example, the ländesbank WestLB,
based in Düsseldorf had five major “conduit” investment programs, including two
known as Harrier Finance Funding and Kestrel Funding, that raised capital by
selling short‐term commercial paper to investors. The Bank then attempted to make
profits on this money by investing it in higher‐yielding securities that included
securities such as structured investment vehicles, described above, that were
derived from American sub‐prime mortgages.160 The trading of these asset‐backed
securities ground to a virtual halt starting in 2007, due to the inability to accurately
value these securities in a market in which many of the mortgages that backed them
were worthless. As the result, the state of North Rhine‐Westphalia was forced to
inject one billion euro into WestLB and provide another 3 billion in loan guarantees
because of the bank’s losses relating to these investments.
The situation was even worse in the state of Saxony. The state had to issue
2.73 billion in loan guarantees to its ländesbank, Sachsen LB, and the other state‐
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owned banks (sparkasen) had to provide another 14 billion in guarantees to bailout
Sachsen LB. Hamburg‐based HSH Nordbank required one billion in capital to bail it
out and the Bavarian state bank, BayernLB, declared losses of 4.3 billion euro and
reported that it was transferring risk‐affected securities amounting to 24 billion
euro into a fund backed up by warranties of 6 billion euro that would be backed by
the Bavarian sparkassen and the State of Bavaria.161
As the structure of these bailouts show, the German state owned banks are
supposed to bail each other out in a crisis, but many of these banks are also in
trouble and therefore they are not in a position to help their peers. It is estimated
that if an industry giant like WestLB were to fail, at least two other ländesbanken
with cross ties and a dozen savings banks (sparkassen) linked through the German
Savings Bank Association (Sparkassen‐Finanzgruppe) would crumple along with it.
The failure of a major ländesbank and its interlinked network of sparkassen could
also affect corporate and small business customers, who would be deprived of
capital and possibly be put at risk of bankruptcy as well.162
Losses from American sub‐prime securities have also occurred at German
private banks, just as such losses have accumulated on the ledgers of banks around
the world, particularly in the U.S. and Europe. The cooperative bank, IKB Deusche
Industriebank AG, a corporate lender, had to be bailed out by the German federal
government in February 2008, for the second time since August 2007, due to
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massive write‐offs from its sub‐prime mortgage securities losses. This bailout
consisted of 1 billion euros provided by the German federal government through its
development bank, KfW, which is IKBs principal shareholder. Other banks and
investors were expected to cover another half a billion euros in losses at IKB. This
federal bailout was rationalized by the need to avoid a significant loss of confidence
in the German financial sector that would result from the failure of IKB. Various
German banks provided the previous bailout package for IKB in August 2007. In
both cases, IKB was essentially deemed too big to be allowed to fail, even though it is
a relatively small lender.163 Deutsche Bank, the giant German private commercial
bank, also took write downs from sub‐prime losses of 2.2 billion euro in the third
quarter of 2007 and another 2.5 billion in losses in the first quarter of 2008.164

The Role European Central Banks and the European Union in the Sub‐Prime
Banking Crisis in Germany

The liquidity crisis that resulted from the draining of the interbank financial
markets because of uncertainty and losses in sub‐prime mortgage securities helped
to push affected banks into crisis. The central banks in Europe have acted to inject
cash back into the system. The European Central Bank (ECB) surprised markets
with a 15 billion euro infusion of extra loans for banks to use to firm up their
balance sheets over the Easter holiday weekend, 2008, for example. The timing
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coincided with the end of the financial quarter, a time when accounting
requirements often cause increased demands for cash by the banks from the money
market lending pool that banks tap for day‐to‐day operations. 165
These actions by the European Central Bank, as well as similar actions by the
central banks of several European countries, are attempts to defuse the credit crisis
with infusions of capital for cash–strapped banks to borrow to cover losses or a lack
of liquidity resulting from their sub‐prime investments. However, European
regulators are casting a jaundiced eye on the German state guarantees and bailouts
of the German public banks, since guarantees on German public bank investments
were supposed to have ended in 2005 according to Germany’s agreement with the
EC, as noted above. These state bailouts may be violations of the EU rules on state
aid for ailing enterprises. Under European rules, the German banks that were bailed
out might be required to pay back the aid that they received if the EC determines
that these rules were violated. The EC is particularly looking at the state aid that was
provided to IKB Deutshe Industriebank and SachsenLB. The German government is
arguing that their assistance conformed to the “market economy principle” in which
the state is merely providing the equivalent of the aid that any private investor
would provide for a private institution to protect his investment. Germany has also
argued that the bailouts were necessary to avoid a broader financial crisis. Some
analysts maintain, however, that these two banks are too small to cause widespread
problems if they fail. The European commissioner for competition, Neelie Kroes,
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maintained that, “It is hard for European citizens to understand why they have to
suffer from the economic downturn, while taxpayer’s money is poured into once‐
profitable banks that took excessive risks and might now avoid paying for their
risky strategies.”166
From the German perspective, the EU position creates a paradoxical
situation. The Germans feel that the 2005 dictate from Brussels, which required the
elimination of state guarantees on the investments of publically owned German
banks, was a major factor in the current German banking crisis. In the view of some
German analysts, the consequence of this change meant that the public banks were
no longer able to borrow money at lower rates than their private competitors. This
change precluded the continued feasibility of the previous business models for
public banks, since they could not generate high enough returns on their traditional
investments to sustain their higher borrowing costs. Hard up for funds, many of
these public sector banks began their speculation in high‐yield sub‐prime mortgage
vehicles and derivatives. This scenario seems to explain why Germany’s public
sector banks speculated far more heavily in American sub‐prime mortgage
securities than the private banks. “Hard up for funds, many of the public‐sector
banks began speculating with high risk securities....Lacking a functioning business
model, they turned to what was essentially gambling—and lost.”167
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion
Germany is typically held up as the prototypical example of a country with a
bank‐based financial system that conforms to the model of a so‐called cooperative
market economy. The German system is often juxtaposed to U.S. or British examples,
which are held up as the prototypes of liberal market‐oriented economies, whose
financial systems are based on securities markets rather than banks. An analysis of
the German banking system both supports and refutes the truths of such “black and
white” comparisons. In fact, global market forces have already impacted German
banking, a fact brought out by the heavy involvement of German banks in the
elaborate investment vehicle systems peddled by American financial markets. The
increased involvement of German banks in the securities markets reflected an effort
by German public banks to move away from their traditional reliance on low profit
interest margins generated by their traditional lending practices as the hausbanken
for German firms. The quest of German banks for higher profits through increased
involvement in global financial markets reflects their efforts to change their
business model and represents an example of global convergence in the banking and
securities markets. This quest for higher profits through securities investments on
the part of German banks was also pursued by banks around the world, many of
whom have been similarly stung by the bursting American mortgage bubble.
Unfortunately, this changed business model has been a disaster for German public
banks, at least in the short term.
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The current German bank crisis will likely propel changes that will
fundamentally alter the German banking system. Prior crises, going back to the
1920s, have typically resulted in consolidations of the German banking system, for
example. Consolidations are already afoot or threatened as the result of the current
German financial crisis. The need for bank consolidations in Germany is an oft‐
repeated refrain by analysts of the German banking system, even before the present
financial crisis. These analysts point to the fact that the German banking system is
unusually splintered with a large number of small banks.168 The resulting
competition among German banks is thought to hold down profits and efficiencies of
scale that tend to make German banking less profitable and less competitive when
compared to their counterparts in Europe and elsewhere.
The presence of the very large public bank sector in Germany has also
distorted bank competition. For example, public guarantees previously granted to
public banks allowed them to obtain capital at cheaper rates than their private
competitors, thereby decreasing the need for these banks to innovate to achieve the
self‐sustaining profit levels required in the absence of public subsidies. The recent
stated withdrawal of the government guarantees on public bank investments, which
was required by the European Commission (EC), has underscored the need for a
more complete divestment of public ownership in German banks. This need is
becoming increasingly obvious since a system with public ownership still leaves the
government responsible for bank losses. Furthermore, the new business models of
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the public banks have led to decreased returns to the public in the form of low
interest financing for projects deemed to have a greater public good. Instead,
German public banks are moving into riskier, higher yield financial investments
offered by the world’s financial markets. In this setting, there is less incentive for
German governments to pay for the losses of these banks when they get decreasing
“gains” in return. The existence of ongoing risk to the government, and therefore to
German taxpayers, is underscored by the continued de facto government
“guarantees” resulting from the simple fact that the public owns the public sector
banks. Although the European Union had insisted on the elimination of statute‐
mandated guarantees on public bank investments, the government is backing the
current investment losses of the public banks anyway. This persisting, de facto
guarantee has resulted in huge government payouts to cover public bank losses on
sub‐prime mortgage securities, despite the displeasure of the EC.
Government payouts to cover losses in the public banking sector are not new
in Germany. It is estimated that more than 20 billion euro have been drained from
German treasuries over the last decade to cover losses at public banks.169 These
losses have been laid at the feet of government inefficiency and weakness in dealing
with public banks resulting from a fatal mix of greed, political protection, and the
amateurism of public officials that sit on public bank boards.170 These past losses
may be dwarfed by the on‐going government bailout of public banks triggered by
the U.S. sub‐prime mortgage investment losses and the resulting evaporation of
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liquidity in the money market. The liability of the government for these bank losses,
which could reach devastating proportions if the banking crisis deepens, speaks to
the need for public divestiture of these banks. Such a divestiture could follow the
models used in the 1980s and 1990s by Germany’s neighbors to achieve banking
systems with smaller public banking footprints. This European banking
transformation was often achieved through bank consolidations and by allowing
public banks to transform into joint stock corporations or cooperatives.
Consolidations took place both within and across the banking pillars of these
comparator European countries. The end result for these countries was an
apparently strengthened and more profitable banking sector, and a much smaller
public banking pillar. Although Germany actually started with a smaller public
banking sector than many of its neighbors in the 1980s, Germany failed to transform
and privatize its banking system and its public banking system is now the largest of
these comparator countries.
The bank system transformations that took place in Germany’s European
neighbors in the 1980s and 1990s offer blueprints for Germany. Such a German
transformation will likely be imposed by the European Union over time if Germany
fails to act, as can be seen by the actions of the European Commission (EC) in 2001
and 2002 that stipulated the elimination of German government guarantees of
public bank investments in 2005. If further bank system transformations are
imposed on Germany by the EC and not embraced and directed from within, there
will be an increased likelihood of instability in the German banking system. In this
scenario, German banks will be increasingly forced to straddle the divide between a
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privatized, market driven system and a public banking system. The Germans must
build their own bridge across this divide.
The restructuring of the German banking system will require a number of
changes. This will have to include a restructured bank stability system, including a
bank stability system that crosses European boarders to accommodate an increase
in Pan‐European banks. This later stability framework will require cooperation
within the EU and will likely have to involve the European Central Bank (ECB) in
greater regulatory responsibilities. Unfortunately, simply “privatizing” the German
public banks by issuing joint stock companies does not get the German taxpayer off
the hook if the private banks that result are not properly structured and removed
from politically incestuous relationships with their local governments. The example
of the joint stock corporation that created the Bankgesesllschaft Berlin bank out of
the Ländesbank Berlin and other Berlin state government bank holdings, which was
cited in Chapter Six, demonstrates the pit‐falls of semi‐privatization, and the need
for proper prudential and regulatory arrangements at the national level that will
accommodate changes to the German banking system that are not covered by
current banking stability structures. Both the banking system and the bank
regulatory‐stability framework will need to be reworked at the same time. This is
essential if real gains to the public are to be achieved by privatization and if the
historical and remarkable stability of the overall German banking system since
World War II is to be maintained after restructuring.
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German public banks operate under the local laws of their länder (states).
These laws often preclude bank consolidation and restructuring that extend across
länder boarders. Since ländesbanken and sparkassen are public banks, private
sector institutions cannot acquire them. These issues must be addressed,
presumably through new federal laws that will allow for the consolidation and
privatization of public banks under a federal bank restructuring program. Also,
regional limitations on the business operations of sparkassen and other public
banks must be lifted, as these laws preserve the fragmented German banking
market and thereby distort competition. The governance of public banks must be
taken out of the hands of public officials when the banks are privatized, for reasons
already discussed, and to encourage private investment.171 Although privatization of
the public banks carries risks that dictate careful government supervision and
regulation to avoid risky behavior on the part of the privatized banks, we have seen
from the behavior of current public bank managers, with their recent gambles on
sub‐prime mortgage investments and derivatives, that public bank management is
fraught with the same risks in the present global financial market. Ideally,
privatization and a smaller public banking system will allow German bank managers
to heed proper market signals and incentives without the distortion of public
involvement.
I do not propose that downsizing the German public banking system, with a
commensurate increase in the private banking sector, represents a panacea for all
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the problems facing the German banking system. Private banks, such as Deutsche
Bank, have also sustained large losses from structured sub‐prime vehicle
investments, for example. Still, the examples provided by other European banking
systems suggest that the sustainability and strength of the German banking system
depends on such changes, particularly if German banks are to compete in the global
market place. Although the notion of privatization seems to run counter to the
German cooperative model of capitalism, there are cultural factors in German
capitalism that drive some of the positive features of this model. These cultural
factors are not necessarily dependent on public banks. For example, German
commercial banks play the role of hausbanks for the large corporations and the
relatively smaller firms that they service, and these are not public banks. The role of
Deutsche Bank in the affairs of the Daimler Corporation, cited in the Introduction, is
a classic example of the role that banks play in the German corporatist economy.
Deutsche bank is, of course, a private bank. The proposed restructuring of the
German banking system assumes the continued existence of government owned
development banks to continue public development projects that ländesbanken
sometimes assumed.
The German economic train has not always followed the same “cooperative
model” economic track. The German economy does not have to invariably and
indefinitely follow this model if certain aspects of the present economic structure
lose their benefits. Aspects of the current federalized (decentralized) public banking
structure originated in the Allied reconstruction plans after World War II and in that
sense are not even German. It is fascinating to note that the German system was not
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always so bank‐based. Germany had the most developed stock market in Europe
prior to World War I. In 1913, stock market capitalization relative to GDP was six
times higher in Germany than in the United States. At the same time, bank
development in Germany was on par with the U.K. and lower than in the U.S.172
Therefore, German capitalism was much more market‐driven and less bank oriented
in the past. This relationship was, of course, reversed after World War II. A return to
a more market driven economy is therefore quite possible for Germany, although it
is assumed that Germany would follow a European model of market capitalism
rather than an American model of market capitalism, as Germany becomes
increasingly integrated into the economies of Europe through the adaption of EU
policies. The structure of German banking is, therefore, almost certain to change
over the relative near term.

Krahanen JP and Schmidt RH, “Purpose and structure…”, p 7; and “Taking
Stock…”, p 506
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